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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND WORK IN INDIA
AND ON OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES
SEPTEMBER 2020
SAI MADHURIKA MAMUNURU
Integrated M.A. (B.A. + M.A.), UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Deepankar Basu
This dissertation is a collection of three essays. In the first essay titled, Declining
female workforce participation in India: the role of status, caste and seclusion, I ex-
amine the role of caste-based wealth inequality and families’ social status signaling in
the declining female workforce participation in India. Specifically, I propose the fol-
lowing explanation: Traditionally, Brahmin (upper caste) women were more secluded
and did not work outside the house, while non-Brahmin, often poorer, women did. As
a result, working outside the house is a mark of low social status and female seclusion
is a type of Veblen good. With increased income, non- Brahmin families withdraw
women from the workforce in order to signal their enhanced social status. This is a
part of a larger process of cultural emulation referred to as the Sanskritization of non-
Brahmin families. Using social network data, I show that while Brahmin women are
more secluded, for non-Brahmin women, greater household wealth is associated with
vii
greater seclusion. Moreover, using a nationally representative panel dataset, I show,
in favor of the Sanskritization hypothesis, that while Brahmin women’s participation
in work outside the house is lower than non-Brahmin women’s, the magnitude of the
wealth effect on participation rises as we move down the caste hierarchy, resulting in a
convergence at higher levels of wealth. I show also that the Sanskritization hypothesis
holds only for casual work (i.e. more vulnerable and stigmatized types of work) and
not for regular, salaried work.
In the second essay titled, Why are Indian women studying more but working
less?, I explore the U-shaped relationship between educational attainment and work-
force participation among women in India. Specifically, I build on a principal-agent
model of the household, with asymmetric information about the work performed by
the woman (the agent) at home. Using this model, I show that a negative relationship
between educational attainment and workforce participation may exist in four scenar-
ios. First, if more educated women are more likely to marry into wealthier families
reducing their financial need to work. Second, if educational attainment improves
women’s productivity within the home. And third, if more educated women are more
likely to marry into families that have a greater preference for household work - either
because of more labor intensive child-care preferences or if it is believed that working
women are likely to reduce the social status of the family. And fourth, if education
increases women’s preference for white-collar jobs.
In the third essay, which is a co-authored paper with Daniele Girardi, Simon Hal-
liday and Samuel Bowles, titled Does Economics make you selfish?, we investigate
the idea that studying economics makes you act less cooperatively and have more
conservative policy opinions. There is good reason to believe this given that con-
ventional economics courses repeatedly expose students to examples self-interested
behavior and offer a moral justification for such behavior by suggesting that the un-
coordinated actions of self-interested individuals are led by an invisible to a Pareto
viii
optimal outcome. We use a transparent difference-in-difference approach to arrive
at the causal impact of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on the
experimentally elicited social preferences and policy opinions of students. We find no
discernible effect of studying economics (whatever the course content) on self-interest
or beliefs about others’ self-interest. Results on policy preferences also point to little
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CHAPTER 1
DECLINING FEMALE WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION
IN INDIA: THE ROLE OF STATUS, CASTE AND
SECLUSION
1.1 Introduction
Female workforce participation in India has been low and declining. According to
the quinquennial National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data, it went from
being 32.8% in 1993-94 to being 24.8% in 2011-12 in rural India and from being 15.5%
in 1993-94 to being 14.7% in 2011-12 in urban India. See Table 2.1. This was despite
the fact that during this period India grew at an average rate of 6.4% per year; the
fertility rate (in terms of births per woman) fell from 3.80% to 2.41%1 and educational
attainment among women rose.
There has been a lot of important and insightful work on why female workforce
participation may have been declining in India. The causes include both demand side
and supply side factors. One major supply side reason has been found to be a strong
negative other household income effect. In other words, as incomes of other family
members rose, women stepped out of the workforce (Klasen and Pieters 2015; Bhar-
gava 2018). Another important reason is the role of educational attainment. Greater
educational attainment causes a delay in joining the workforce. Moreover, Klasen
and Pieters (2015) argue that greater educational attainment may improve women’s
marriage market returns, allow them to marry into wealthier families and due to a
strong negative income effect, lead to a lower probability of participation in the work-
1Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
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force. There are also some demand side factors: In India, the services sector, that is
least likely to employ women, has grown faster than the manufacturing and agricul-
ture sectors. Lahoti and Swaminathan (2016) find that growth in manufacturing and
agriculture sectors has a positive effect on female employment.
The explanation that I propose, and find evidence for in this paper, is based on
the role of identity, caste-based income inequality and social status signaling in the
declining female workforce participation observed in India. Traditionally, Brahmin
(upper caste) women were more secluded and did not work outside the house, while
non-Brahmin, often poorer, women did. As a result, working outside the house is a
mark of low social status and female seclusion is a kind of a Veblen good. A Veblen
good is a good consumed in order to emulate “the leisure class” or the rich and signal
rising wealth and social status (Veblen 1934). With increased income, non-Brahmin
families emulate Brahmin families and withdraw women from the workforce in order
to signal their enhanced social status. The broader process of taking on a Brahmin
or Sanskrit way of life is referred to as Sanskritization.
In addition to signaling enhanced social status with rising wealth, preventing
women from working and restricting their interaction with the opposite sex is also a
means to enhance the family’s respectability. Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-
Drott (2018), for example, study the social norms governing labor supply decisions
of women in Saudi Arabia. They find that while men privately support female work-
force participation, they underestimate how far other men from similar social settings
support it. And once, men were, at random, made aware of the general social accept-
ability of women working, workforce participation among these families increased.
Another compelling piece of evidence about the role of culture and social norms in fe-
male workforce participation decisions comes from Fernandez and Fogli (2009). They
use past female labor force participation and total fertility rates from the country of
ancestry for women that were born in the United States but whose parents were not,
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as a proxy for culture, and show that culture does indeed play a role in the economic
decisions women make. Specifically in India, for Hindu women, men outside the
family are seen as “polluting”. Preventing women from interacting with men from
outside the family and restricting them from working outside the house, are ways
to protect the “purity” of the woman and therefore the respectability of the family
(Jayachandran 2019; Desai and Andrist 2010).
Empirically testing and establishing the role of Sanskritization in the declining
workforce participation of women in India has been challenging for two main reasons.
The first challenge is to attain conceptual clarity and arrive at testable hypothe-
ses. This involves answering questions like: What does Sanskritization mean when it
comes to women and work? What should we observe if Sanskritization did indeed play
a role? Would Sanskritization impact participation in all kinds of work? Relatedly,
are all kinds of work equally stigmatized? The second challenge is with accurately em-
pirically identifying Sanskritization as a cause of the decline. Most of the papers that
study this issue use the NSSO dataset which is extensive, nationally representative
and has been conducted quinquennially since 1983. But, it is cross sectional and not
panel. This means that while it is possible to observe relationships between income
and workforce participation, it is impossible to account for unobservable household
or individual characteristics that may determine behavior and bias our estimates.
In order to overcome the first challenge, and conceptually define the impact of
Sanskritization on women’s work, I cite literature from case studies in sociology. I
also analyze publicly available social network data (from Banerjee et al. (2013)) cov-
ering 16,951 individuals from 70 villages in southern-Karnataka to show that female
seclusion may indeed be a kind of a Veblen good. I calculate the total number of so-
cial connections (acquaintances, friends, etc) possessed by each individual and show
that (a) Women from all castes tend to possess fewer connections when compared to
men from the same caste. (b) This type of seclusion - possession of fewer connections
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when compared to the men - is greater for upper caste women than for non-upper
caste women. (c) For all women rising wealth is associated with greater seclusion and
this relationship is stronger for non upper-caste women than for upper caste women.
Motivated by the case studies and the social network analysis, I formally char-
acterize the process of Sanskritization in women’s work, in terms of other household
income (income earned by the household but excluding any wages earned from the
woman’s work) effects on participation in work outside the house. I show that San-
skritization would reflect in two stylized observable phenomena: (a) Brahmin women’s
participation in work outside the house will be lower than that for all other castes at
all levels of other household income. And, (b) although initially much higher, with
increasing other household income, non-Brahmin women’s participation in work out-
side the house will converge to that of the Brahmin women’s levels. In other words,
other household income effects of non-Brahmin women will be greater than those of
the Brahmin women. See Figure 1.1 for a diagrammatic representation of the main
hypotheses. In the absence of Sanskritization, such caste-wise differences in behavior
would not exist. i.e regardless of caste, female participation in work outside the house
would be high at low levels of other household income and decline with rising other
household income for all women uniformly.
In order to estimate the other household income effects, I use a nationally rep-
resentative panel dataset from the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS). The
survey covered 41,554 households in 2005 and re-interviewed 83% of the respondents
in 2012. I use an individual fixed effects model to estimate the other household
income effects on work outside the house. Accounting for individual fixed effects
helps correct for endogeneity that may be caused by unobservable household level
characteristics. Moreover, as a proxy for other household income, I use a measure of
household wealth. This is because, in a highly agricultural economy like India, house-
hold income in the current period may be subject to large transitory shocks and since
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the panel covers only two periods, we can not calculate multi-year averages. Also,
using household wealth helps deal, to some extent, with reverse causality that may
exist between household income in the current period and workforce participation in
the current period. I also disaggregate work outside the house and estimate wealth
effects separately for casual (irregular, temporary) work and regular, salaried work.
I do this because not all types of work are likely to be equally stigmatized - regular,
salaried employment that requires more skill and educational attainment may be less
stigmatized than irregular, low-skilled, temporary employment.
The results of the empirical exercise provide evidence in favor of the Sanskriti-
zation hypothesis. I find that Brahmin women’s participation in work outside the
house is lower than that of all other castes. Moreover, as predicted by the model, the
wealth effect on participation in work outside the house is larger (more negative) for
non-Brahmin women than it is for Brahmin women, causing a convergence at higher
levels of wealth. I find also that such caste-wise differences in participation and con-
vergence at higher levels of wealth are seen only for casual or more vulnerable and
stigmatized forms of work. For regular, salaried work, greater wealth is associated
with greater participation for women of all castes. Figures 1.6 and 1.7 summarize the
main findings of the paper. Figure 1.6 shows the participation levels of women from
different castes in work outside the house broadly and casual and regular, salaried
work separately. Figure 1.7 plots the wealth effects on the probability of working
outside the house, by caste after controlling for individual and time fixed effects and
individual and household level characteristics.
1.2 Background and related literature
This paper contributes to two related strands of literature and two broad ques-
tions. The first is about the declining female workforce participation in India and
the second is the literature on Sanskritization and its effect on gender and work in
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India. Female seclusion as a means to gaining (or maintaining) the family’s social sta-
tus is culturally practiced in India. Brahmin (upper-caste) women were traditionally
more secluded and did not work outside of the house for a wage. It has been argued
that as household incomes rise among non-Brahmin families, they may become more
Brahminized or Sanskritized (Srinivas 1977; Srinivas 1956; Chen and Drèze 1992).
Specifically, with upward economic mobility, in order to attain a higher social status,
lower caste families may withdraw women from the workforce. Moreover, among the
different types of work performed for a wage, some professions are more respected
than others (Beteille 1991). The objective of this paper is to ask if such social status
considerations contributed to the low and declining female workforce participation in
India.
1.2.1 Trends in female workforce participation in India
Female workforce participation in India has been declining over the past three
decades. Using the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) data, I find however,
participation in all kinds of work did not decline (at the same rate). While participa-
tion in family based (on a family farm or in a family business) work declined, work
outside the home for a wage rose. And within work outside for a wage, the proportion
engaged in regular, salaried work rose and those engaged in casual, temporary work
declined.
According to the quinquennial nationally representative household level survey
conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), female workforce
participation has been declining in rural India and stagnant in urban India since the
early 1990s. See Table 2.1 for NSSO estimates. Several arguments have already been
made about how the NSSO underestimates and counts women’s work. Hirway and
Jose (2011) and Hirway (2012), for instance, show using time-use survey data that
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women are engaged in unpaid, informal work both for subsistence and production
that the NSSO survey is not equipped to handle.
In keeping with these arguments, the IHDS data, a nationally representative panel
dataset that I use for analysis in this paper shows a decline in female workforce partic-
ipation rates between 2004-05 (IHDS-I) and 2011-12 (IHDS-II) but of a much smaller
magnitude than that shown by the NSSO. See Figure 1.4 (a) for IHDS estimates. I
then look at the types of work in which participation declined and the types of work
in which it didn’t. Figure 1.4 (b) shows that participation in work outside of the
house rose for all castes. And within work outside, the proportion of those that were
engaged in regular salaried work rose (see Figure 1.5 (a)) and those engaged in casual
work fell (see Figure 1.5 (b)).
Despite some debate over the extent of decline in workforce participation and
varying changes in different types of work, it can not be denied that workforce par-
ticipation, overall, stagnated despite rapid economic growth, decline in fertility rates
and rising education attainment among women during these years. The question
then is could higher levels of participation in work-outside the house have reversed
this stagnation. Did cultural factors, rising household incomes and family status
considerations, mute the rising participation in work outside the house?
Several reasons have been offered in the literature for why workforce participation
has been declining in India. The one that’s most pertinent here is the role of rising
household incomes excluding that of the wife. Theoretically, household income not
earned through own wages would have a negative effect on workforce participation.
With greater income, the marginal benefit of the woman’s work declines, causing
them to allocate time away from work for wages. This effect may be exacerbated for
women in societies where there exists a gender based division of labor and a social
stigma against women performing certain kinds of work for a wage. Indeed, one of
the main factors that is said to have caused declining workforce participation among
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women is rising household incomes (Neff, Sen, and Kling 2012; Klasen and Pieters
2015; Afridi, Dinkelman, and Mahajan 2016; Bhargava 2018; Sarkar, Sahoo, and
Klasen 2019). Sarkar, Sahoo, and Klasen (2019) also find a strong negative wealth
effect on the probability of entering the workforce and strong positive wealth effect
on the probability of leaving the workforce for women.
Factors other than the large and significant other household income effect have
also been outlined. Bhargava (2018) finds that women’s own wage elasticities, though
positive, are small and outweighed by the other household income effect. Moreover,
Klasen and Pieters (2015) and Afridi, Dinkelman, and Mahajan (2016) explain how
rising education levels among women have contributed to declining workforce par-
ticipation rates. Firstly, rising education levels may cause a delay in women joining
the workforce. Secondly, greater educational attainment may improve the marriage
market returns for women, allowing them to marry into higher income households
and reducing the financial need for them to work. Finally, educated women’s returns
to home production may outweigh their returns in the labor market.
This last factor about poor prospects for women in the labor market is also cor-
roborated by other studies. Lahoti and Swaminathan (2016) argue that economic
growth in itself may not improve workforce participation rates of women. The nature
of growth matters too. Areas where sectors that tend to employ women (agriculture
and manufacturing) grew, also saw improvements in workforce participation rates of
women. In addition to what we already know about the factors that cause workforce
participation rates to decline, the objective of this paper is to look at the social and
cultural constraints that may restrict women from joining the workforce.
1.2.2 Caste, family status and women’s work
Upper caste women are more likely to secluded and less likely to participate in
the workforce. Lower caste women, often from poorer households, are more likely to
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be working, although this might change with rising household incomes. Moreover,
certain professions, usually those that involve greater education attainment, are more
respected than others.
Srinivas (1977) argues based on his case studies that, specifically, in rural India,
there are four distinct hierarchical classes. Firstly, there is the big landowning class
that only supervises other workers and carries out no cultivation or manual work.
Secondly, there is the small land-owning class that cultivates its own land and may hire
laborers if the need arises during transplantation, weeding and harvesting. Thirdly,
there are the tenants who lease out land from the big landowners and hire themselves
out as laborers during the busy months. And finally, there are landless laborers who
subsist only by hiring themselves out as daily or seasonal laborers.
As it relates to social status and gender, he writes,
the idea is widespread that working for wages is a mark of low status,
and landowners ..., do not work for wages. This is true for both men and
women. The women, in particular, find high status inconsistent with even
extra-mural movement, with the result that upward mobility leads to their
‘immurement’. [Emphasis mine.] (Srinivas 1977)
Chen (1995) also explains how class, caste, gender and work intersect. She finds
that, women from the upper-caste, big land-owning classes usually remain secluded
and rarely take part in activities outside the house. Women from the middle castes,
work on domestic duties or on their own fields. They may hire themselves out during
the busy months. The lowest social group comprised of women from the lowest
classes and poorest households, regularly seek work for wages in order to support
their families.
Referring to the process of Sanskritization she writes:
Among the innumerable small local castes which constitute the vast
‘middle’ of the caste hierarchy, what is considered appropriate behaviour
or work for women is closely linked with the family’s position (ascribed
or aspired) in the social-status hierarchy. As a means to acquiring status,
those who can, follow upper caste norms in regard to women’s lifestyles.
[Emphasis mine.]
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Work performed for a wage is not all the same, however. Some professions and
types of work are more respected than others. Beteille (1991) writes about how social
esteem is tied to the work one performs. He writes:
Doctors, engineers, academics and other professionals enjoy greater
esteem than most other members of society... Important factors behind
the esteem enjoyed by the professions in all modern societies are the high
levels of education required for entry into them and their... association
with specialized knowledge and technical ability... not merely the material
returns. (Beteille 1991)
In addition to these case studies, recent studies have tried to empirically estimate
the role of status effects specifically as they relate to caste. It has been documented
extensively that after controlling for all other determinants of workforce participation,
lower caste women are more likely to be working (Klasen and Pieters 2015; Sarkar,
Sahoo, and Klasen 2019). Other papers have documented the impact of social status,
caste and culture on workforce participation of women in India.
Eswaran, Ramaswami, and Wadhwa (2013) measure the status effects on female
workforce participation decisions. They measure status in terms of caste, wealth and
education levels of the female members of the household. They use the amount of land
held in rural India and the occupational status of the male member of the household
in urban India as a proxy for wealth. They propose, first, that the time allocation of
women’s labor market work relative to the men must reduce as we move up the caste
hierarchy. And second, that wealth will reduce the market work of women relative
to their husband’s at a faster rate as we move up the caste hierarchy. They test
their hypotheses using NSS (2004-05) and a Time Use Survey conducted in 1998-99
both of which are cross-sectional household level surveys. While they find evidence
in favor of their hypothesis about caste, they find that families with higher wealth
had greater female supply relative to men. They suggest that this may be because
household labor may be called upon to help when more land is cultivated.
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More recently, Desai and Joshi (2019) ask if cultural norms play a role in shaping
household reactions to rising incomes. They estimate a household fixed effects model
to determine the impact of log of family income on any work, family work and wage
work. They estimate this model for all women, for a subset of women that practice
purdah/ghunghat - covering over one’s face - and for a subset of women that do not
practice purdah/ghunghat. Similarly, Reed (2018), finds that though absolute levels
of wealth did not have a conclusive effect on female seclusion, rising wealth caused
female seclusion (greater practice of purdah/ghunghat) to increase.
The role of social status considerations has also been explored in relation to ed-
ucation attainment among women in India. Specifically, unlike what theory would
predict, greater educational attainment for women is associated with declining (or U-
shaped) workforce participation. Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman (2018) and Das
and Desai (2003) find that a part of the explanation for this phenomenon is cultural.
They find that women with more education marry into richer families that enable
them to withdraw from the labor force.
This paper improves upon and complements the current literature on status effects
and female workforce participation in the following ways. First, I define the process
of Sanskritization in terms of clear testable hypotheses. Second, I look only at work
outside of the house since it is work outside the house that is likely to carry social
stigma by reducing female seclusion. Third, I disaggregate work outside of the house
into those jobs that carry greater (or less) social stigma. Fourth, given the panel
nature of the dataset, I am able to account for individual fixed effects and therefore
control for unobservable individual or household level characteristics that may drive
workforce participation decisions. Fifth, I use a comprehensive measure of household
wealth. Specifically, I use an asset index that captures closely the living conditions
of the household - including the construction quality of the house and the consumer
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durables owned. And, finally, I explicitly look at Brahmins as the reference caste
since the social status of a family in India is intrinsically linked to caste hierarchy.
1.3 Network evidence for gender, caste and seclusion
In addition to the literature cited above about upward economic mobility, social
status signaling and female seclusion, I show here using social network data that (a)
Women from all castes tend to possess fewer connections when compared to the men
from the same caste. (b) This type of seclusion - possession of fewer connections when
compared to the men - is greater for upper caste women than for non-upper caste
women. And (c) for all women, rising wealth is associated with greater seclusion and
this relationship is stronger for non upper-caste women than for upper caste women.
This last finding shows that female seclusion is indeed a kind of a Veblen good.
I analysed a publicly available dataset (originally collected for Banerjee et al.
(2013)) that contains information on the social connections possessed by individuals
in 70 villages in southern Karnataka. Specifically, I analyze the network which depicts
the union of all social relationships possessed by an individual - friends, lenders,
creditors, acquaintances through religious congregations, etc. ‘Degree’ here is the
sum total of all social connections possessed by an individual.
The dataset contains information on 16,951 individuals in all. Table 1.2 summa-
rizes the main variables from this dataset. Female is an indicator variable for women.
Wealth is a composite household wealth index. I constructed the index by conducting
a principal component analysis on 5 measures of housing quality including type of
roof/construction, number of rooms in the house, number of beds, presence and type
of electricity connection and type of sanitation facilities available to the house. I then
re-scale the index such that the lowest wealth value in the sample takes the value of 0
and the highest takes the value of 100. Caste here is divided into four categories: ST,
SC and OBC refer to Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste and Other Backward Classes
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respectively. General refers to upper castes including Brahmins and other forward
castes. When I refer to non-upper castes, I refer to ST, SC and OBC families.
Using this dataset, I estimate the following model for each caste, separately.
Degreeih = αih + β1Femaleih + β2Wealthh + β3Femaleih ∗Wealthh + uih (1.1)
where i stands for individual, h for household, Degree is the sum total of all social
connections possessed by an individual, Female is a dummy that takes on 1 for a
woman, Wealth is the composite household wealth index and Female ∗Wealth is
the interaction term.
Table 1.3 presents the estimates from Equation 1.1. Two results are of interest to
us. First, women have a smaller degree (fewer connections) than men of the same caste
and this disparity is greatest for the General category women. ST women have 0.032
fewer connections on average than ST men, SC women have 1.27 fewer connections
than SC men, OBC women have 0.896 fewer connections than OBC men and General
category women have 1.757 fewer connections than General category men.
Second, while increasing wealth is associated with increased disparity in social
connections between men and women for both groups, the relationship is stronger
for the non-upper caste category. This warrants some elaboration: Keeping wealth
constant, the difference in degree between men and women in the non-General (non
upper-caste) category is 0.828 implying that on average men have 13.774 connections
while women have 12.964. Now, let us say there is a 10% increase in wealth. This
would be associated with men’s dergee going up by 1.92 but women’s only go up by
1.22. The disparity among men and women in the non-upper caste category therefore
rises to 1.510 from 0.828 with a 10% increase in wealth. By a similar calculation, a
10% increase in wealth in General category is associated with the disparity among
men and women going up to 2.097 from 1.757.
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In conclusion, from this analysis, it can be seen that female seclusion is indeed
a kind of a Veblen good. Brahmin women tend to be more secluded on average.
And for non-Brahmin women, greater wealth is associated with greater seclusion.
This suggests that with rising wealth, families credibly signal enhanced status by
consuming what Brahmin families consume - in this case, greater seclusion of women.
1.4 Theoretical framework
The primary objective of this model is to define the process of Sanskritization in
terms of stylized testable hypotheses. Going by the literature cited above, I make the
following key assumptions that form the basis of the model: (a) The woman’s time
(regardless of the caste that she belongs to) is divided between providing work for a
wage and working to produce household goods - including status for the family. (b)
She experiences an increasing marginal disutility from providing work for a wage. And
(c) given the high social status that Brahmin women are born into, I assume that the
marginal product (in status) from time spent at home is high, positive and constant.
For women from non-Brahmin families, the marginal product (in status) from time
spent at home increases at a decreasing rate with other household income. I arrive at
two stylized hypotheses that can be tested against the data available as depicted in
Figure 1.1. Essentially, Brahmin women’s workforce participation at all levels of other
household income is lower than it is for non-Brahmin women. Moreover, all women
have a negative other household income effect, however, non-Brahmin women’s other
household income effects are greater in magnitude than those of Brahmin women’s.
Let us consider a household that consists of a couple - a male member of the
household and a female member. Let us then assume that they jointly consume a
market good (x) and a status good that is produced using the woman’s time (r).
They also individually experience a disutility of working for a wage (d(l)). However,
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let us abstract from the use of the man’s time and assume he uses all of his day
working for a wage and earns a fixed total income (Y ).
The household utility function is:
V = u(x) + λ[ηr] + (1− λ)[δ(Y )r]− d(l) (1.2)
u(x) is the utility derived from the joint consumption of the good x. I assume
diminishing marginal utility from consumption of the market good. Additionally, (in
order to simplify comparisons in income effects across castes) I assume that the rate
at which the marginal utility u′(x) diminishes, is constant.
u′′(x) = u0 < 0 (1.3)
d(l) is the disutility derived from time spent working for a wage by the woman.
Let us also assume that the disutility from performing work for a wage increases at
an increasing rate. Additionally, (in order to simplify comparisons in income effects
across castes) I assume that the marginal disutility from labor d′(l) increases at a
constant rate.
d′(l) > 0; d′′(l) = d0 > 0 (1.4)
λ is an indicator variable that switches based on caste as follows:
λ =

1 for a Brahmin family
0 for a non-Brahmin family
(1.5)
η and δ(Y ) are status production functions. Given the differential levels of social
status that families of different castes start off with, they face different production
functions for the production of the public good. Upper caste families have a linear
status production function such that the marginal product (η) of time spent by the
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woman within the house is high, positive and constant. The status production func-
tion of non-Brahmin families is such that the marginal product (δ(Y )) increases at a
decreasing rate with income. As income tends to infinity, the marginal product tends
to that of the upper caste families. Moreover, time spent at home (female seclusion),
can be thought of as a kind of a Veblen good. Brahmin women traditionally did not
work outside the house. For non-Brahmin families, not working outside the house is a
credible signal of rising income given that it involves foregone wages. The opportunity
cost of working for a wage, therefore, rises with income for non-Brahmin families.
η > 0 (1.6)
δ′(Y ) > 0; δ′′(Y ) < 0 (1.7)
δ(0) = 0; lim
Y→∞
δ = η (1.8)
Families face two constraints: The woman has a limited number of hours in a day
(1.9), and each family can spend only as much as they earn (1.10).
l + r = 1 (1.9)
In the above Equation 1.9, I abstract away from leisure as in Braunstein and
Folbre (2001).
px = wl + Y (1.10)
Substituting equations 1.9 and 1.10 into equation 1.2 we can rewrite the household









+ λ[η(1− l)] + (1− λ)[δ(Y )(1− l)]− d(l) (1.11)
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+ δ(Y )(−1)− d′ = 0 (1.13)








= δ(Y ) + d′ (1.15)
Equations 1.14 and 1.15 mean that the family equates the marginal benefit of an
additional hour of work for wages - i.e. the additional market good that can now be
bought and consumed - to the marginal cost - i.e. the disutility of work for wages
plus the production of status that is foregone. Given the production functions that
the respective families face, we can see that:




l∗|λ=0 = l∗|λ=1 (1.17)
where l∗|λ=1 is the optimal female workforce participation arrived at by the upper-
caste family and l∗|λ=0 by the lower caste family. See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
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In order to ensure that the equilibrium levels of l∗ arrived at in equations 1.14
and 1.15 are locally stable maxima, we differentiate the first order conditions by l





u′′ − d′′ < 0 (1.18)
In the absence of status considerations η = 0 and δ(Y ) = 0. The optimal level
of workforce participation would equate the marginal benefit of work - additional
availability of the market good u′(x)w
p
- to the marginal cost - the marginal disutility
of working for a wage d′(l) - resulting in a greater supply of female labor for all castes
at any positive level of income.
Let us now examine the effect of an increase in income not earned through women’s
wages.































































From equations 1.21 and 1.22 we can see that the effect of income not earned
by the woman on her workforce participation is negative regardless of caste. This is
intrinsically because of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption of the market
good and because of the increasing marginal disutility of working for a wage. However,
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from 1.21 and 1.22 we can also see that the income effect for upper caste households








In conclusion, conceptually, Sanskritization would imply two phenomena. First,
at every level of other household income, Brahmin women, will participate less than
lower caste women in the workforce. See equations 1.16 and 1.17. Second, although
negative for all, the other household income effects on participation in work outside
the house for non-Brahmin women will be greater than that for Brahmin women.
This implies that as other household incomes rise, participation rates of non-Brahmin
women will converge to Brahmin levels. See equations 1.22, 1.21 and 1.23. These
hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1.1.
1.5 Data and descriptive statistics
I use data from the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS). It is a nation-
ally representative survey covering 41,554 households in 1503 villages and 971 urban
neighborhoods across 33 states and union territories of India. It is a household level
panel which was conducted first in 2004-05 and then again in 2011-12. The topics
surveyed include health, education, employment, economic status, marriage, fertility,
gender relations, and social capital. Additional information was also collected on the
school, village and medical facilities. In 2011-12, due to attrition, IHDS-II (2011-12)
re-interviewed 83% of the households from IHDS-I (2004-05) as well as split house-
holds (if located within the same village or town) to trace changes in their lives (Desai
and Vanneman 2010; Desai and Vanneman 2015). For the purposes of this paper, the
2We can directly compare 1.21 and 1.22 even though the optimal l∗ for both castes is different.
This is because of the assumptions we made in Equations 1.3 and 1.4. They ensure that u′′ and d′′
are constant regardless of the level of l.
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sample includes women in the working age population i.e. any woman that is 15 years
or older and 64 years or younger either in the year 2005 or in 2012. Below, I describe
the measures for other household income, work, caste, educational attainment and
other controls used in the econometric exercise.
For caste, I use a classification of households between Brahmin, Forward caste,
Other Backward Classes, Dalit and Adivasi. The non-Brahmin castes include Forward
Caste, Other Backward Classes, Dalit and Adivasis. It must be stated here that
collecting caste-related information through household surveys is challenging and may
be subject to a degree of error. First collecting data through sampling surveys may
privilege large prominent caste groups over small marginalized ones. Second, while
self-identifying, caste-identification can be done at varying levels of generalization or
specificity. And when the responses are open-ended, it is the job of the interviewer
or researcher to classify and aggregate into the larger more general caste groupings,
which may lead to errors (Desai 2010; “Caste links Quantifying social identities using
open-ended questions”). However, despite these shortcomings, the IHDS dataset was
still the right choice because of the advantages provided by a panel dataset for the
question at hand. In order to reduce the possibility of error, I exclude from the
dataset, families whose caste classification changed between 2005 and 2012.
I use household wealth to measure the economic mobility of a family over time.
What we are specifically interested in, here, is changes in the permanent income of
the family. In a largely agricultural society like India, a yearly measure of household
income would be subject to large transitory shocks. Multi-year averages of household
income over time would be ideal. However, since the panel dataset used here, covers
only two periods, multi-year averages in income can not be calculated while also
accounting for individual fixed effects. In such a circumstance, household wealth is
arguably a good proxy for the economic conditions of the family.
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The household wealth measure collected by the IHDS is comprehensive, compu-
tationally simple and clear. The survey includes an asset index that ranges from
0 (lowest) to 30 (highest) in 2005. The same index ranges from 0 to 33 in 2012. I
normalize both to a 0 to 1 scale. Both the 2005 and 2012 measures capture the owner-
ship of consumer durables such as television sets, scooters/motor-cycles, cars, sewing
machines, etc and the housing construction quality on a six-point scale. As seen in
Figure 1.2, mean household wealth declines as we move down the caste hierarchy.
I compare the wealth distribution of Brahmin families with that of Adivasi fami-
lies in Figure A.1 in the Appendix. There are two important lessons from this figure.
Firstly, as expected, the median household wealth for Brahmin families (at approx-
imately 0.7) is much greater than the median household wealth for Adivasi families
(at approximately 0.2). Secondly, and importantly, there is a considerable overlap in
the wealth distributions of both castes, for both years - 2005 and 2012. This overlap
allows us to credibly compare household wealth effects on workforce participation, for
a given level of wealth, across castes, as we propose to do in this paper.
Next, we need an appropriate measure of women’s work. Here, I propose to focus
only on work outside the house and exclude from the analysis work performed on a
family farm or for a family business. This is because, it is the former that is likely to
involve greater interaction with men of the opposite sex, imply lesser seclusion and
therefore carry more stigma. Any work outside the house is measured by a binary
variable that takes on 1 if a woman did any work for pay (or goods) outside of the
family farm or any family business. Specifically, the binary variable equals 1 if she
worked outside the home for more than 240 hours a year and 0 otherwise. As seen in
Figure 1.4, workforce participation (as a whole) increases as we move down the caste
hierarchy. Participation in paid work outside of family farms and family businesses
also rises as we move down the caste hierarchy. The rise, however, is steeper in the
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latter suggesting that upper caste women are more likely to be working in household
enterprises if at all.
I also disaggregate work outside the house into two categories - casual work and
regular, salaried work. Casual labour refers to irregular employment, usually on a
daily or hourly basis. Casual workers are primarily employed in the informal sector
(both agriculture and non-agriculture) and make low daily wages. This type of em-
ployment status comes with a high level of vulnerability. Srivastava and Srivastava
(2010) find that 52.1% and 47.7% of women from extremely poor and poor families,
respectively, are engaged in casual labor. In this dataset, I use a binary variable that
equals 1 if a woman is recorded as having done a job that is casual and 0 otherwise.
For regular, salaried work, I use a binary variable that equals 1 if a woman is recorded
as having performed work (outside of her family farm and family business) as a part
of a regular, permanent or salaried job with a longer term contract. Among women
that do undertake work outside of family enterprises, only about 15% work in regu-
lar, salaried work. Others engage in part-time, short-term casual employment. The
proportion of working women engaged in regular, salaried work declines steeply as we
move down the caste hierarchy. See Figure 1.5.
Here an important qualification is in order. By defining the dependent variables
as above, we are excluding from our analysis those women that are actively looking
for work - or are unemployed. In other words, we are looking at the workforce partici-
pation of women as opposed to the labor force participation. In developing countries,
most individuals can not afford to look for a job. If their financial circumstances
require them to work, they will take up work that helps them make ends meet. In a
recent study, Feng, Lagakos, and Rauch (2018) find that unemployment is largely a
developed country phenomenon. They say, “In poor countries, only the most skilled
workers search for wage jobs, while most of the less skilled workers select into tradi-
tional self-employment activities. Thus, few workers in poor economies are actually
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unemployed in practice.” This is specifically true in the case of India. According to
the World Development Indicators, between 1991 and 2018, female unemployment in
India was the lowest at 2.19% in 1991 and highest at 4.17% in 2005. It has stagnated
at a little less than 4% since.
The control variables include own education level measured in terms of completed
years of education, own education level squared, age, age squared, number of children
below 5 years of age in the household, number of children between 5 and 15 years
of age in the household, household size, number of elderly members present in the
household, a dummy for marital status (that is equal to 1 for married women and 0
for all others) and a dummy for urban areas. Educational attainment, importantly,
is measured in terms of completed years of education. As seen in Figure 1.3, among
women, educational attainment, declines as we move down the caste hierarchy. In
order to further clarify the contrast I compare the distribution of years of education
completed among Brahmin women with that of Adivasi women in Figure A.2 (in the
Appendix).
Table 1.4 summarizes all the variables of interest disaggregated by Brahmin and
non-Brahmin and year. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix summarize all the
variables to be used in the model below by individual caste and year.
1.6 Econometric methodology
The objective of this section is to show that, after controlling for other relevant
covariates that could affect female workforce participation and individual and time
fixed effects, upward economic mobility has a larger negative effect on workforce par-
ticipation for non-Brahmin women than for Brahmin women. I use household wealth
to measure upward economic mobility over time for a family and look at its effect
on the participation of women in work outside the house, broadly and disaggregated
into casual and regular, salaried work, specifically.
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I estimate two sets of models using three measures of work for women - any work
outside the family farm or family business, work in regular, salaried employment and
work in casual (irregular, temporary, manual) employment. The basic econometric
model for the first set compares uses Brahmin as the reference group and compares
them to non-Brahmin families as a whole. The second set includes dummies for every
individual caste among the non-Brahmins.




Pr(Workingit = 1) = αi + δt + β1Wealthit
+ βFC1 WealthitFCi + β
OBC
1 WealthitOBCi + β
D
1 WealthitDi + β
A
1 WealthitAi
+ β2Controlsit + uit (1.25)
where i is individual and t is time period (either 2005 or 2012). Brahmins are the
reference group, NB is a binary variable that takes on 1 for all non-Brahmin families.
FC is a binary variable that takes on 1 for forward caste families; OBC is a binary
variable that takes on 1 for all families in the “other backward classes” category; D
is a binary variable that takes on 1 for Dalit families; and A is a binary variable that
takes on 1 for Adivasi families. For each of the equations above, I estimate the effects
both with and without individual and household level controls.
If Sanskritization indeed did characterize female workforce participation decisions,
then based on the model developed in Section 3 (Equation 1.23), β1 < 0, β
i
1 < 0 where
i = FC,OBC,D,A,NB. In other words, we would see a negative wealth effect for
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Brahmins and the wealth effects for all other castes would be higher in magnitude
(more negative) than for the Brahmins.
Individual fixed effects are included to ensure that heterogeneity in individual pref-
erences are accounted for. Time fixed effects are also included because un-observable
macro-economic and regional changes may have taken place between 2005 and 2012
that may have affected the behaviour and circumstances of the cohort as a whole.
Since the dependent variable in this case is a binary variable, one of two models
can be used - a linear probability model or a non-linear probability model like probit
or logit. Picking any one comes with some advantages and some disadvantages. If
a linear probability model were to be used, the predicted probabilities may be less
than 0 or greater than 1 which are meaningless results. However, using a non-linear
model with individual fixed effects is complicated, requires restrictive assumptions
and may lead to biased estimates (Neyman and Scott 1948; Lancaster 2000). Given
that the main interest here is to examine the marginal effect of an increase in wealth,
by caste, I use a linear probability model. However, I check the robustness of the
results presented by also applying the non-linear models. 3
One possible weakness of the model being estimated here is that I am not using an
exogenous shifter in household wealth. We can therefore not rule out the possibility
of biased estimates caused by reverse causality. A household may be wealthy because
the woman of the household works contributes to augmenting it. In this case, Sarkar,
Sahoo, and Klasen (2019) who use a similar measure of wealth as the one used here,
argue that the wealth effect would be a lower bound on the actual wealth effect.
3By using Equations 1.24 and 1.25, we are assuming that wealth and other covariates affect the
probability of entry into and exit out of the workforce symmetrically. Sarkar, Sahoo, and Klasen
(2019) find this to not be the case. However, we may still be justified in using Equations 1.24 and
1.25 for two reasons: First, looking at entry and exit probabilities separately might not allow us to
draw clear conclusions about wealth effects which are the main measures we are interested in here.
Second, looking at entry and exit probabilities requires that we cut the sample in half based on
employment status in 2005. Given that what interests us here is an accurate and precise estimation
of wealth effects, by caste, cutting the sample this way may not be warranted.
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Another source of endogeneity may be that there may be some unobservable factors
that cause a household to both be rich and also have the woman not work. Individual
fixed effects account for or solve most of this latter challenge.
In order to ensure that the results are not a function of the specific model used, I
also test the hypotheses using two non-linear probability models with random effects
and a linear probability model on the pooled cross section data without accounting
for individual fixed effects. Like Klasen and Pieters (2015) I also estimate the wealth
effects after controlling for the district share of male workers in agriculture, in non-
agricultural labor and in white collar professions. Klasen and Pieters (2015) use
these district level characteristics as indicative of the labor demand conditions faced
by individuals.
1.7 Results
In Section 1.4, we formalized the impact of Sanskritization on female workforce
participation decisions and characterized this process in terms of two testable hy-
potheses (as in Equations 1.16, 1.17 and 1.23 or Figure 1.1). In this section, I present
evidence in favor of these two hypotheses. First, I show that Brahmin women’s par-
ticipation in work outside the house is lower than it is for all other castes at all
levels of household wealth. Moreover, the participation rates of non-Brahmin women
converge to Brahmin levels as wealth rises. Specifically, this phenomenon is true for
casual work and not true of for regular salaried work. Second, I show that after
controlling for individual and time fixed effects and other household and individual
level characteristics, the wealth effect on participation in work outside the house is
negative and larger in magnitude for non-Brahmin women than it is for Brahmin
women. Again, this is specifically true for casual work and not regular, salaried work.
I also check the robustness of the results using four different variations of the original
econometric model and present the results below.
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1.7.1 Participation in work outside the house, by caste
Figure 1.6 shows the percentage of women from each caste that are engaged in
casual work (Panel a), regular, salaried work (Panel b) and any work outside the house
(Panel c) for all levels of household wealth. The lines are fitted non-parametrically
- without controlling for any other covariates - on a scatter plot of household wealth
and a dummy for the different types of work.
Figure 1.6(a) shows that, caste-wise differences in participation in casual work
do exist. Brahmin women’s participation appears to be low and declines (although
marginally) with an increase in household wealth. As we move down the caste hier-
archy, participation in casual work rises at all levels of household wealth. However,
the decline with rising wealth also seems to become steeper as we move down the
caste hierarchy. At the highest levels of household wealth, participation in casual
work seems to be low and similar for all castes. From Figure 1.6(b), we can see that
as household wealth rises, participation in regular salaried work rises too and stark
caste-wise differences in workforce participation do not exist when it comes to regular,
salaried work.
As seen from Figure 1.6(c) with rising wealth, participation in work outside the
house actually marginally increases for Brahmin women. This may be because higher
levels of household wealth may be associated with higher levels of education for Brah-
min women. They are able to secure regular, salaried employment. With increasing
wealth, participation in any work outside the house declines for all other castes.
1.7.2 Household wealth effects on participation in work outside the house
Table 1.5 presents the household wealth effects on participation in work outside
the house broadly and casual and regular, salaried work separately, by caste. See
also Figure 1.7. Our main hypothesis, as stated earlier is that the wealth effects on
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participation in work outside the house must be greater for non-Brahmin women than
for Brahmin women.
After controlling for other covariates and accounting for individual fixed effects, I
find that for Brahmin women a 10% increase in wealth would result in a 0.5% increase
in the probability of participating in work outside the house. For non-Brahmin women
on the other hand, a 10% increase in wealth would result in a 1.54% decline in the
probability of participation in working outside the house. Overall, the effect of a 10%
increase in household wealth is 2.04 percentage points greater (more negative) for
non-Brahmin women when compared to Brahmin women.
It is important to note that this effect is driven primarily by withdrawal from
more stigmatized forms of work - casual work. For Brahmin women, a 10% rise
in wealth causes a 0.4% decline in the probability of participation in casual work.
For non-Brahmin women, 10% rise in wealth would result in 1.83% decline in the
probability of participation in casual work. Overall, the effect of a 10% increase in
household wealth is 1.39 percentage points greater (more negative) for non-Brahmin
women than it is for Brahmin women. Moreover, as we move down the individual
non-Brahmin (Forward Caste, OBC, Dalit and Adivasi) castes the magnitude of the
wealth effect rises.
As for regular, salaried work, increase in wealth is associated with an increased
probability of participation for all castes. For Brahmin women, a 10% increase in
wealth results in a 1.1% increase in probability of being in the regular, salaried work-
force. For non-Brahmin women, the effect is smaller but still positive. A 10% increase
in wealth results in a 0.2% increase in participation in regular, salaried work.
See Figure 1.7 for a plot of the wealth effects, by caste for work outside the house
broadly and casual and regular, salaried work separately.
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1.7.3 Robustness checks
I examine the relationship between wealth and participation in casual work, regu-
lar salaried work and any work outside the house for women, using four variations of
the main econometric model proposed above and find that the results do not change
qualitatively. The wealth effect rises in magnitude as we move down the caste hier-
archy for casual work and any work outside the house. It does not rise this way for
regular, salaried work.
Figure A.4 shows wealth effects on casual work, regular salaried work and any work
outside the house using a logistic regression with random effects and Figure A.3 shows
wealth effects on casual work, regular salaried work and any work outside the house
using a probit model with random effects (assuming that the omitted or unobservable
individual characteristics are uncorrelated with the covariates). Both show that the
wealth effect is small for Brahmin families and larger for non-Brahmin ones for casual
work and any work outside the house as we would expect with Sanskritization.
Figure A.5 shows wealth effects on casual work, regular salaried work and any work
outside the house using a linear probability model without accounting for individual
fixed effects. As seen here, wealth effects get larger as we move down the caste
hierarchy for casual work and any work outside the house. Figure A.6 shows wealth
effects on casual work, regular salaried work and any work outside the house using
a linear probability model accounting for individual fixed effects but also controlling
for district employment characteristics. There is no qualitative difference between the
results from the main model and the one shown here.
1.8 Conclusion and discussion
Let us now go back to our initial motivating questions. First, and more generally,
do social status considerations - and their interaction with caste membership - influ-
ence workforce participation decisions in India? Based on the argument above the
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answer to this question would be yes. Second, and more specifically, did such social
status considerations contribute significantly to the recent decline in female workforce
participation rates in India? The answer to this question needs a little elaboration.
Our analysis has focused on work outside the house, which accounts for only a part
of total female workforce participation (the other excluded part being work in family
farms or small family businesses) and has in fact marginally increased in the period
we study. But, it could have risen more if participation in casual work did not decline
with rising household wealth. A negative household wealth effect may have therefore
contributed to a slower rise in work outside of the house and therefore to an overall
decline in female workforce participation.
As mentioned earlier, there may be other explanations to the differing wealth
effects on participation in work outside the house that I have not accounted for in
this paper. One of them is that even within casual labor, women of different castes
may be employed in different occupations. The different occupations may then entail
different disutility of labor. For instance, among those that worked a casual job, 24%
of the Brahmin and 5.37% of Forward caste women said they worked as a teacher while
only 1% of the non-upper caste casual workers were teachers. On the other hand,
while over 60% of the casual workers from non-upper castes worked as agricultural
laborers, that number was 17.28% among Brahmin casual workers. In other words,
wealth effects may rise in magnitude because the type of work being done is more
onerous as we move down the caste hierarchy. While this explanation can not be
ruled out, there may be reason to believe based on the evidence presented above that
some of this may be driven by social status considerations.
In conclusion, I must comment briefly on the role of economic growth and moder-
nity in workforce participation rates of women. Goldin (1994) argued that economic
growth and labor force participation would share a U-shaped relationship. The initial
decline was due to the movement of production from household-family enterprises to
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the larger market, to social stigma against work outside of the house and to a strong
income effect. Eventually, she says that as women get more educated, white collar
jobs become available to them, the value for their time in the market increases, the
substitution effect dominates the income effect and women enter back into the la-
bor force. India has, however not seen such a U-shaped relationship despite rising
education levels (Lahoti and Swaminathan 2016).
While social norms about gender may be slow to change, a crucial aspect of
Goldin’s argument is the transition out of household-family enterprises to white col-
lar jobs in the manufacturing and services sectors. This transition from temporary,
low-paying and high risk jobs to salaried white collar jobs has not been smooth or
rapid enough for women in India. From the analysis above it appears that with ris-
ing household wealth, women are able to step out of casual work but they are not
simultaneously moving into regular, salaried work in large enough numbers to stem
the decline in overall workforce participation.
In order to facilitate the employment of women in high quality jobs, more jobs
need to become available in the manufacturing sector, which has not been the case
in India. Figure A.7 (in the Appendix) shows the value added by the manufacturing
sector as a percentage of GDP for India, Thailand, Bangladesh and South Korea,
for instance. In all the other countries except India, the manufacturing sector grew
during the period captured. And, in all the other countries except India, female labor
force participation was either much greater (Thailand, South Korea) or increasing
rapidly (Bangladesh).
Moreover, while education attainment among women has improved, this improve-
ment has not been uniform across castes. See Figures 1.3 and A.2. Educational
attainment declines as we move down the caste hierarchy. As long as non-Brahmin
women do not have adequate access to education, if they do join the workforce, the
jobs that will be available to them will be the more stigmatized and vulnerable ones.
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And with increasing household wealth, the likelihood that they will choose to drop
out of the workforce will remain high.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1. Workforce participation, by caste and other household income, as de-
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Note: See Equations 1.16, 1.17 and 1.23. The main hypotheses from the model are that the
workforce participation of Brahmin women is lower at all levels of other household income than
that of non-Brahmin women’s. And that, with rising other household income, workforce
participation of non-Brahmin women, converges to Brahmin levels. This would imply that the
other household income effect for non-Brahmin women would be higher in magnitude than that for
Brahmin women.
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Brahmin Forward caste OBC Dalit Adivasi
2005 2012
Note: Household wealth is measured on a 0-1 scale, with 0 being least wealthy and 1 being the
most, based on the ownership of consumer durables and house quality. The blue horizontal line
denotes average household wealth for all families in the sample in 2005. The red horizontal line
denotes average household wealth for all families in the sample in 2012.
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Brahmin Forward caste OBC Dalit Adivasi
2005 2012
Note: Note the blue horizontal line denotes average completed years of education for all women in
2005 and the red horizontal line denotes average completed years of education for all women in
2012.
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Brahmin Forward caste OBC Dalit Adivasi
2005 2012
(b) Work outside the house
Note: ‘Any work’ is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual spent over 240 hours in the
past year working either outside the house or on a family farm or in a family business. ‘Work
outside the house’ is a binary variable that is equal to 1 only if an individual spent over 240 hours
in the past year outside the family farm or family business. The blue horizontal line denotes
average participation among all women in 2005 and the red horizontal line denotes average
participation among for all women in 2012.
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Figure 1.5. Participation of working women in casual and regular, salaried work,





















Brahmin Forward caste OBC Dalit Adivasi
2005 2012



















Brahmin Forward caste OBC Dalit Adivasi
2005 2012
(b) Proportion of working women in casual work
Note: Among women that do work outside the house, ‘regular, salaried work’ is a binary variable
that takes on 1 if an individual worked in a permanent and salaried job. Similarly, ‘casual’ is a
binary variable that takes on 1 if the nature of the work performed was irregular (on a daily or
hourly basis) and in the informal sector. The blue horizontal line denotes average participation
among all women in 2005 and the red horizontal line denotes average participation among all
women in 2012.
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Figure 1.6. Probability of participation in casual work, regular salaried work and
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(c) Work outside the house
Note: In order to construct these figures, a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression was used to
fit lines, without controlling for any other covariates, on a scatter plot of female workforce
participation and household wealth. Each line depicts the proportion of women that work outside
the house, from a given caste, at all levels of household wealth.
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Figure 1.7. Wealth effects (coefficients), by caste, for casual work; regular and
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(c) Any work outside
Note: This figure shows the household wealth effects on female participation in work outside the
house broadly and casual and regular salaried work separately. The effects were computed using
Equations 1.24 and 1.25. I control for individual and time fixed effects. Other controls include -
completed years of education, marital status and age of the woman, household size, number of
children between 0 and 5 years of age, number of children between 6 and 14 years of age and a
binary variable for urban areas. The horizontal bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
Non-Brahmin includes the Forward Caste, OBC, Dalit and Adivasi categories. See Table 1.5 below
and Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix for more detailed figures and results.
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1.10 Tables











Note: Source - Desai and Joshi (2019). The figures are calculated from quinquennial rounds of the
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) survey using the Usual Status criterion. ‘Usual
status’ refers to the activity performed by an individual for the majority of the past 365 days from
the day of the survey.
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Female 0.540 0.560 0.557 0.537
Wealth 14.177 12.673 18.177 19.390
Degree 16.620 15.578 15.817 16.192
Note: Source: Banerjee et al. (2013). Upper Caste broadly includes Forward Caste and Brahmin.
Schedule Tribe corresponds to Adivasi. Schedule Caste corresponds to Dalit. Degree refers to the
sum total of social connections possessed by an individual. Wealth refers to a composite index of
household wealth.
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Female -0.032 -1.270 -0.896 -0.828 -1.757
( 1.138) ( 0.395) ( 0.316) ( 0.231) ( 0.767)
Wealth 0.020 0.102 0.239 0.192 0.189
( 0.056) ( 0.021) ( 0.012) ( 0.010) ( 0.027)
Wealth*Female -0.101 -0.026 -0.071 -0.070 -0.034
( 0.075) ( 0.029) ( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.037)
Constant 17.168 15.166 12.724 13.774 13.859
( 0.843) ( 0.298) ( 0.236) ( 0.172) ( 0.564)
N 963 4216 9058 14270 1993
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: The dependent variable here is degree, meaning the sum total of social connections possessed by an individual. Wealth refers to a composite
index of household wealth on a 0-100 scale, based on housing quality. Female is an indicator variable for a woman and Female*Wealth is the
interaction term. Non Upper Caste includes Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe and Other Backward Classes. Upper Caste includes Brahmin and
Forward Caste. Schedule Tribe corresponds to Adivasi. Schedule Caste corresponds to Dalit.
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Casual 0.037 0.239 0.046 0.301
Regular, salaried 0.034 0.019 0.073 0.040
Work outside 0.069 0.247 0.112 0.305
Household wealth 0.553 0.386 0.601 0.460
Education attainment 7.352 3.881 7.567 4.051
Age 36.126 34.396 42.933 41.454
No. of children (0-5) 0.667 0.795 0.442 0.526
No. of children (6-14) 1.094 1.182 0.862 1.012
Household size 6.251 6.172 5.336 5.421
No. of elderly members 0.298 0.193 0.314 0.239
Marital status 0.850 0.857 0.770 0.789
Urban 0.437 0.255 0.453 0.275
Note: Casual is a binary variable that takes on 1 if the individual took on casual work during the
year. Regular, salaried summarizes a binary variable that takes on 1 if the work performed was
regular/salaried. Work outside is a binary variable that equals 1 when more than 240 hours of work
is performed outside the family farm or family business. Household wealth is a continuous variable
that ranges from 0 to 1, 0 denoting the least wealthy and 1 the most. Education attainment refers
to years of education completed. Marital status takes the value of 1 for a married individual and 0
for everyone else. Urban takes on 1 if the household is located in an urban area, 0 otherwise.
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Table 1.5. Wealth effects on workforce participation, by caste




Ref: Brahmin -0.056 -0.044 0.133 0.110 0.059 0.050
( 0.052) ( 0.053) ( 0.054) ( 0.058) ( 0.070) ( 0.073)
Non-Brahmin -0.175 -0.139 -0.102 -0.083 -0.256 -0.204
( 0.058) ( 0.059) ( 0.055) ( 0.059) ( 0.075) ( 0.077)
Ref: Brahmin -0.056 -0.044 0.133 0.110 0.059 0.050
( 0.052) ( 0.053) ( 0.054) ( 0.058) ( 0.070) ( 0.073)
Forward Caste -0.143 -0.115 -0.108 -0.097 -0.228 -0.199
( 0.070) ( 0.072) ( 0.059) ( 0.063) ( 0.085) ( 0.088)
Othe Backward Classes -0.184 -0.143 -0.130 -0.109 -0.333 -0.270
( 0.064) ( 0.065) ( 0.056) ( 0.060) ( 0.080) ( 0.082)
Dalit -0.202 -0.182 -0.063 -0.046 -0.217 -0.194
( 0.073) ( 0.074) ( 0.058) ( 0.062) ( 0.087) ( 0.089)
Adivasi -0.220 -0.157 -0.069 -0.041 -0.151 -0.049
( 0.106) ( 0.107) ( 0.065) ( 0.069) ( 0.120) ( 0.121)
Time Dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y N Y
N 57251 57251 57237 57237 57251 57251
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: This table shows the household wealth effects on female participation in work outside the house broadly and casual and regular salaried work
separately. The effects were computed using Equations 1.24 and 1.25. I control for individual and time fixed effects. Other controls include -
completed years of education, marital status and age of the woman, household size, number of children between 0 and 5 years of age, number of
children between 6 and 14 years of age and a binary variable for urban areas. Non-Brahmin includes the Forward Caste, Other Backward Classes
(OBC), Dalit and Adivasi categories. See Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix for more detailed results.
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CHAPTER 2
WHY ARE INDIAN WOMEN STUDYING MORE BUT
WORKING LESS?
2.1 Introduction
In India, female education attainment has been rising even as female workforce
participation has been declining. While female education attainment rose because of
cheaper and better access to education provided by the government, female workforce
participation is declining because of various demand and supply-side factors such as
increasing household incomes (not earned by the woman), cultural factors and lack of
adequate employment generation in the economy (Klasen and Pieters 2015; Neff, Sen,
and Kling 2012; Bhargava 2018; Sarkar, Sahoo, and Klasen 2019). At a cross-sectional
level, education attainment and workforce participation share a U-shaped relationship
for women in India. See Figure 2.1. And interestingly, this U-shaped relationship does
not disappear even after controlling for household income not earned by the woman
(Klasen and Pieters 2015; Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman 2018). More specifically,
Klasen and Pieters (2015) find that between 1987 and 2011 there was a large decline
in the positive participation effect associated with secondary and graduate education.
The fact that educational attainment and workforce participation do not share
a positive relationship is puzzling on two inter-related levels. First, what explains
the continued investment in women’s education attainment if it does not eventually
result in workforce participation? Second, why is greater educational attainment
not leading to greater participation in the workforce? The objective of this essay is
to theoretically explain this negative relationship between education attainment and
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workforce participation, with a focus on strategic interaction between spouses within
the household and the welfare implication for the women involved.
Empirically, four major explanations have been outlined in the literature for a
U-shaped relationship between educational attainment and workforce participation.
The first is that educated women have positive marriage market returns to educa-
tion. They tend to marry into wealthier families, reducing their financial need to
work (Klasen and Pieters 2015; Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman 2018; Adams and
Andrew 2019). The second explanation is that education improves women’s produc-
tivity within the home (Hill and King 1995; Jejeebhoy 1995; Klasen 2002). And
if their conditions in the labor market do not improve by the same degree (Sahoo
and Klasen 2018), educated women may choose to not participate in the workforce
(Afridi, Dinkelman, and Mahajan 2016). The third explanation is that educated
women may marry into wealthier families with a greater preference for unpaid house-
hold work performed by the woman. This may be because of more labor-intensive
child and elder-care preferences or because of a belief that working women reduce
the social status of a family by socially signaling economic hardship (as I discuss in
Essay I). The fourth explanation is that education may increase women’s preferences
for white-collared jobs and increase their disutility from casual or low skilled work.
At a time when white-collar jobs are not adequately available in the economy, this
may discourage participation (Das and Desai 2003; Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman
2018).
Greater educational attainment may affect female labor supply decisions in one
final way i.e. through the bargaining position of the woman. Education may improve
a woman’s fall-back position outside of marriage, her cognitive ability, her sense
of agency and self-esteem and consequently alter her bargaining power within the
marriage (Oreffice and Negrusa 2006; Kabeer 2005; Sen 1999). And if she has a
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greater preference for work outside the house her probability of participation in work
outside the house may increase.
Although some of these factors and causes have been empirically outlined in the
literature we need greater clarity on the strategic behavior of individuals within the
household that underlies these processes. In other words, the conditions under which
the above factors would explain the negative relationship between educational at-
tainment and labor force participation need to be explicitly stated. This, in turn,
would allow us to analyze the welfare implications of this phenomenon for the women
and their families. A theoretical model would allow us to do this both tractably and
rigorously.
I build on a two-person non-cooperative model of the household with asymmetric
information about the work performed at home since such a model offers three main
advantages. First, it highlights clearly the conflicting interests of the two individuals
in the sharing of household resources and work. Second, it emphasizes the role of
asymmetric information and enforcement problems related to the work at home. And
finally, it allows us to focus on the power inequality between the man and the woman.
We can illustrate clearly how the man can cause the woman to choose a strategy, that
she herself would not choose, by creating a positive cost of divorce.
In the model, the principal is the man who derives utility from the household
work performed by the woman and controls the total household income (including
that earned through any wage work by the woman). Although he can not perfectly
observe and enforce the amount of household work performed, he has the power to
incentivize it by sharing a part of the total household income with her. Importantly,
the principal incentivizes work within the household by creating a positive cost of
divorce for the woman.
I analyze the model and examine five different scenarios. I find that three causes
(found in the literature and mentioned above) would lead to lower workforce partici-
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pation among educated married women. First, if there are positive marriage market
returns to education, and educated women tend to marry into wealthier families.
Second, if education results in greater productivity in household work. And third, if
wealthier families (or male spouses that prefer more educated women) tend to have
a greater preference for household work. The last two causes that I analyze lead to
more ambiguous results. First is the case when education results in a better fall-
back position outside of marriage for women, and therefore, improves her bargaining
power within the marriage. In this case, workforce participation may be lower among
educated women but only if we place arbitrarily specific restrictions on her utility
function. Second is the case when education increases women’s preference for white-
collar jobs (or makes them more averse to low skilled jobs) that are harder to find in
the economy. In this case too, workforce participation may decline among educated
married women, but only if we place arbitrarily specific restrictions on her utility
function 1.
2.2 Background and context
2.2.1 Stylized facts
There are three phenomena that are pertinent here. First, educational attain-
ment among women in India has been improving over the past few decades. Second,
female workforce participation has been stagnant in urban India and declining in
rural India. Third, the cross-sectional relationship between education attainment
and workforce participation is U-shaped for women in India. And importantly, this
U-shaped relationship persists even after controlling for household income and the
spouse’s education levels.
1The main reason for this, as we will see in Section 2.4 is that the male spouse (the principal)
has the first-mover advantage. If there is a shift in the agent’s preferences or best response function,
he revises his offer accordingly.
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Evidence of improving educational attainment among women in India can be
found by looking at indicators such as the percentage of girls out of school, female
illiteracy, female enrollment in primary secondary and tertiary education, and moth-
ers’ education levels. The percentage of female primary-school-age children that are
out of school has declined from 51% in 1971 to 1.43% in 2013. The literacy rate
among young women, ages 15-24, has steadily risen from 40.32% in 1981 to 90.16% in
2018. The literacy rate among all adult women rose from 25.68% in 1981 to 65.79%
in 20182. Gross enrollment ratios (GER, female)3 in pre-primary, primary, secondary
and tertiary education have consistently increased between 2010 and 2018. Gross
enrollment ratios in tertiary education, for instance, went from 15.06% in 2010 to
29.06% in 2018.4 Finally, the percentage of mothers with no education fell from
55.4% in 2008 to 47.9% in 2014. And, the percentage of mothers with above Class 10
education nearly doubled, going from 4.6% to 8.4%5.
Female workforce participation in India has been low and declining. According to
the quinquennial National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data, it went from
being 32.8% in 1993-94 to being 24.8% in 2011-12 in rural India and from being 15.5%
in 1993-94 to being 14.7% in 2011-12 in urban India. See Table 2.1.
In India, the relationship between educational attainment and participation in
work outside the house among women is seen to be U-shaped. See Figure 2.1 for
my own calculations based on the Indian Human Development Survey datasets from
2005 and 2012 (Desai and Vanneman 2010; Desai and Vanneman 2015). Importantly,
2Data on out-of-school children and female illiteracy from the World Development Indicators
3Number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a
percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education. For
the tertiary level, the population used is the 5-year age group starting from the official secondary
school graduation age.
4Data and definition for GER: UNESCO Institute for Statistics - India Page
5Annual Survey of Education Report (on India) over time
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this U-shaped relationship is not explained entirely by a negative household income
effect. Both Klasen and Pieters (2015) and Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman (2018)
find that the income effect explains only a part of this U-shaped relationship.
2.2.2 Literature review: What explains the U-shaped relationship be-
tween education attainment and female workforce participation in
India?
Several explanations for this non-positive relationship between educational at-
tainment and workforce participation have been outlined in the currently existing
literature on this question. The first explanation is that educated women have posi-
tive marriage market returns to education. They tend to marry into wealthier families
and due to a strong negative income effect, they are less likely to work after mar-
riage (Klasen and Pieters 2015; Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman 2018; Adams and
Andrew 2019).
The second explanation is that education may be improving women’s productivity
within the household. Educated mothers are able to ensure better educational and
health outcomes for children (Hill and King 1995), are able to interface better with
institutions outside the household such, as the government (Jejeebhoy 1995; Klasen
2002), and are able to take better care of themselves and their families. Afridi,
Dinkelman, and Mahajan (2016) argue that while educational factors caused a decline
in workforce participation, they also caused an increase in domestic work. Moreover,
Sahoo and Klasen (2018) suggest that unrelated to ability, gender disparity exists
in the choice of stream for higher education within the same family. Girls are 20
percentage points less likely to pursue technical fields and this affects their workforce
participation, employment and earnings. It is, therefore, possible that given women’s
greater responsibilities within the home, the nature of the education they get and
the type of socialization they experience, education makes women more productive
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within the home and does not improve their conditions on the labor market by the
same degree.
The third explanation is that educated women may be more likely to marry into
wealthier families with a greater preference for household work. This may be because
of the family’s status concerns (Das and Desai 2003) or because of a greater preference
for child and elder care by the woman. The fourth explanation is that educated women
prefer high-skilled white-collar jobs that are not available in the economy for women
to take (Das and Desai 2003; Chatterjee, Desai, and Vanneman 2018). This also
implies that educational attainment increases women’s disutility from the casual or
low-skilled work that may be available to them.
There is one final mechanism through which a woman’s educational attainment
may affect her labor supply decision as a married woman in a situation where hew
own preferences differ from that of her spouse’s. And that is through its impact on the
bargaining power within the household (Oreffice and Negrusa 2006). By improving
women’s cognitive ability, self-esteem, awareness and agency, education allows women
to exercise greater control over resources and decision making within the household
and outside of it. Exposure to new and progressive ideas may also result in direct
collective challenges to men’s powers and priorities (Jejeebhoy 1995; Kabeer 2005). 6
2.2.3 Literature review: types of theoretical models for female labor sup-
ply decisions
Several types of household models may be used to model female labor supply. See
Figure 2.2 for a summary. Of the possibilities outlined, a non-cooperative principal-
agent model of the household is pertinent to the question at hand for three reasons.
First, it highlights clearly the conflicting interests of the two individuals when it comes
6A study in West Bengal also found that educated women were less likely to experience and were
better prepared to handle domestic violence (Sen 1999).
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to work at home and in the sharing of household resources. Second, it emphasizes the
role of asymmetric information and enforcement problems related to work at home.
And finally, it allows us to focus on the power inequality between the principal (the
man) and the agent (the woman). We can illustrate clearly how the man can cause
the woman to choose a strategy, that she herself would choose not to, by creating a
positive cost of divorce.
A unitary model consists of a single welfare function maximized subject to a pooled
budget constraint. The welfare function is determined directly by the consumption
of the husband and the wife. This model, initially developed by Becker (1991), solves
the problem of aggregating individual utility functions by assuming the presence of
a benevolent dictator who keeps the interests of his or her family members in mind
(Becker 1991). However, this model does not accurately represent either the conflict
involved in household decision making or the institutional mechanisms under which
these conflicts are resolved (Katz 1997).
There are two types of non-unitary models - cooperative and non-cooperative.
In a cooperative household model the outcomes are Pareto efficient. Pareto efficient
outcomes are possible but not necessary in non-cooperative models.
Cooperative household models may again be of two types - Nash bargaining (McEl-
roy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980; Lundberg and Pollak 1993) and
collective (Browning et al. 1994; Chiappori 1992). Unlike a unitary model, a Nash
bargaining model deals with individual utility functions and individual threat points.
These models maximize a Nash product function subject to a pooled budget con-
straint. A collective model is a generalization of a Nash bargaining model. Here, the
household maximizes a weighted sum of its members’ utility functions subject to a
pooled budget constraint. The weights, in turn, are determined by individuals’ threat
positions.
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Both Nash bargaining and collective models are an improvement over unitary mod-
els in that they deal with individual utility functions and individual threat points.
They also conceptualize the household demand function as being a result of a strate-
gic interaction between two individuals. However, as Katz (1997) writes, they treat
both family members as symmetric. She writes that these models fail ”to recognize
systematic, gender (and age) - based power relations which structure household re-
source allocation. In other words, the household is not just a random collection of
human beings, but an institution infused with historical and psychological meanings
which significantly impinge upon its economic decision-making” (Katz 1997).
Basu (2006) works with a collective model of the household and focuses on the
endogeneity of labor supply and bargaining power. His model allows for the possibility
that ”the decisions that a household takes may influence the household’s balance of
power with a certain time lag.” Specifically, female labor supply in a given period
may depend on her bargaining power but may also influence her bargaining power
in the future. He then shows that a model such as this is characterized by multiple
equilibria where two households with the same characteristics may find themselves at
different levels of labor supply.
Non-cooperative models (Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Lundberg and Pollak 2008)
allow for both individual utility functions and individual budget constraints. Katz
(1997) writes that non-cooperative models account for ”three features of family life...:
asymmetric information, enforcement problems and inefficiency.” There are two types
of non-cooperative models of the household - the Cournot-Nash framework (where
each individual makes a decision taking the other’s as given) and the principal-agent
framework. Principal-agent models of the household most closely resemble employer-
employee or landlord-tenant relationships.
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2.3 Basic model of female workforce participation
In this model, we assume that the household consists of two married adults - a
man, the principal and a woman, the agent. We are assuming that the household
consists of no children.
The principal controls all the household income including any earned by the
woman. He cares about (or derives utility from) a normal consumption good that he
consumes and a good produced by the woman’s time at home. Assume that this latter
good is a representation of the goods and services that the woman produces at home
that only the man consumes - washing his clothes, cooking food for his consumption,
caring for his parents, etc. He picks the amount of the total household income that
he shares with the agent and uses what remains for his own consumption. He would
like to share as little household income with her as possible and also maximize his
total utility.
The agent cares about the normal consumption good that she consumes and de-
rives disutility both from work performed at home and from work performed outside
the home for a wage. We assume here that she derives more disutility from work at
home than work outside the home. The amount she has to spend on her consumption
good is constrained by the amount of money that the principal shares with her.
The main conflict here is that even though the principal derives a positive utility
from the time spent by the agent at home, this time is not perfectly observed by him.
He needs to pick a monetary amount to share with her in order to incentivize her to
work at home. He gives her an amount that would make her utility in the marriage
greater than her fall-back position. This makes the cost of divorce positive for the
woman. She, therefore, picks a greater proportion of time working at home than she
would have at her fall-back position (Bowles 2009).
The game is played in two stages. First, the principal picks a monetary amount
to share with the agent. The agent then responds by choosing the proportion of
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time that she works at home. In choosing the amount to share with her, therefore,
the principal is constrained by her participation constraint (Her total utility should
be equal to or greater than her fall-back position.) and her incentive compatibility
constraint (her best response function - or the first-order condition derived from her
utility function - her best response to every amount share by the principal).
Going forward in this section, we derive the constraints first, then analyze the prin-
cipal’s behavior and finally discuss the equilibrium. In the next section, we analyze
how greater educational attainment by the woman, would affect different parameters
in this basic model and consequently affect the equilibrium itself.
2.3.1 Agent
2.3.1.1 The agent’s utility function
The total utility derived by an agent during a single point of time is:
Uf (x
f , l, r) = uf (x
f )− dl(l)− dr(r) (2.1)
where uf (x
f ) is the utility derived by the agent from the consumption of xf such
that:
u′f (x
f ) > 0; u′′f (x
f ) < 0 (2.2)
dl(l) is the disutility derived by the agent from performing l proportion of their
time outside the home, such that:
d′l(l) > 0; d
′′
l (l) > 0 (2.3)
And dr(r) is the disutility derived by the agent from performing r proportion of
their time inside the home, such that:
d′r(r) > 0; d
′′
r(r) > 0 (2.4)
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The agent faces the following constraints:
pxf = h (2.5)
For now, let p = 1. h is the total amount paid by the principal to the agent. And,
l + r = 1 (2.6)
Here, we are normalizing the total time available to the agent, to divide between
work at home and outside the home, to 1. Substituting 2.5 and 2.6 into 2.1, we get:
Uf = uf (h)− dl(1− r)− dr(r) (2.7)
Let us now briefly examine the shape of the indifference curves of this value
function in terms of h and r.












Figure 2.3 shows the indifference curves that depict the agent’s per-period utility
function.
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2.3.1.2 The agent’s value function
We now want to move from analyzing the agent’s per-period utility function to
understanding her total value from the marriage i.e. her per-period utility multiplied
by the total number of periods that the marriage lasts.
The probability that the marriage is terminated depends on r, the proportion of
time spent working at home.7
t(r) = 1− r (2.11)
As mentioned earlier, the total value derived by the agent from the marriage is
given by the per-period utility multiplied by the number of periods that the marriage






The agent maximizes this total value with respect to r subject to equations 2.5
and 2.6. Substituting 2.1, 2.11, 2.5 and 2.6 into 2.12, we get:
Vf (h, r) =
uf (h)− dl(1− r)− dr(r)
1− r
(2.13)
Let us now briefly examine the shape of the indifference curves of this value
function in terms of h and r.
[








dh = 0 (2.14)
7For the termination function mentioned in Equation 2.11, it is only essential that ∂t∂r < 0. This








uf + (1− r)(d′l − d′r)− dl − dr
(2.15)
Note that the slope of the indifference curve goes from negative, to vertical, to
positive as the value of the denominator goes from positive, to 0, to negative. Figure
2.4 shows the indifference curves or iso-value curves depicting the value of the marriage
to the agent.
2.3.1.3 The participation constraint
The participation constraint for the agent is that the value that she derives from
the marriage must be greater than her fall-back position.
For now, let us assume that her fall-back position is:
z = 0 (2.16)
The participation constraint faced by the principal would therefore be:
Vf (h, r) =
uf (h)− dl(1− r)− dr(r)
1− r
≥ 0 (2.17)
2.3.1.4 The incentive compatibility constraint
In order to arrive at the incentive compatibility constraint faced by the principal,
we need the agent’s best response function for every value of h that the principal can
offer. For this, we maximize the value function with respect to r and derive how the









(−d′l(−1)− d′r)(1− r)− (uf − dl − dr)(−1)
(1− r)2
= 0 (2.19)
Simplifying, we get the first-order condition:
uf + (1− r)(d′l − d′r)− dl − dr = 0 (2.20)
Notice how the left-hand side of Equation 2.20 is the same as the denominator of
2.15. In other words, the best response function intersects the iso-value curves when
the iso-value curves are vertical. See Figure 2.4.






(Vf − z) (2.21)
This essentially means that the agent, in choosing r will equate the marginal cost
of working at home (the left-hand side of the equation) to the marginal benefit of
working at home (the right-hand side of the equation). The marginal benefit is the
reduced probability of her marriage ending multiplied by the value of the marriage
to her.
From Equation 2.21, we know one more important detail. This is that if the incen-
tive compatibility constraint is met, so is the participation constraint. For Equation
2.21 to be true, Vf > z.
Now, given that we have not defined specific functional forms, we need to invoke
the implicit function theorem in order to ensure that we can explicitly express r in
terms of h. Specifically, let:
F (r, h) = uf + (1− r)(d′l − d′r)− dl − dr = 0 (2.22)
According to the implicit function theorem for the expression r = r(h) to be
meaningful, two conditions need to be met. First, in the neighborhood, N of point
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(r0, h0), Fr and Fh must be continuous partial derivatives. And, second, in this
neighborhood, Fr 6= 0. If these two conditions are met, r = r(h) is a meaningful
expression and, importantly, we know that ∂r
∂h
exists.
Fr = (1− r)(d′′l (−1)− d′′r) + (d′l − d′r)(−1)− d′l(−1)− d′r (2.23)
Simplifying:
Fr = −(1− r)(d′′l + d′′r) < 0 ∀ r 6= 1 (2.24)
Note, that in addition to meeting a condition for the implicit function theorem,




f > 0 (2.25)
Since the conditions for the implicit function theorem are met for all r 6= 0, we
can now explicitly state
r = r(h) (2.26)
Moreover, by the implicit function rule,
dr
dh





−(1− r)(d′′l + d′′r)





(1− r)(d′′l + d′′r)
< 0 ∀ r 6= 1 (2.28)




2.3.2.1 The principal’s utility function
For the principal, let us assume a simple Cobb-Douglas utility function where he
cares about - the consumption good he consumes (xm) and the good produced by the
woman’s work at home r. Let the production function for the good produced at home
by the woman be ηr where η > 0. And, let the weights attached to the consumption
good and the good produced by the agent be a and 1− a respectively.
The principal’s utility function would therefore be:
Um = (xm)
a(ηr)1−a (2.29)
The total budget available to him, to spend on the consumption good, is the sum
of his own income Y and the agent’s wage labor wl minus the amount that he spends
on the good produced by the agent h. The budget constraint is, therefore:
pxm ≤ Y + wl − h (2.30)
Let us assume that p = 1. And since we are assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility
function with positive marginal utilities for both goods, we know that the budget
constraint will be met with an equality.
Rewriting 2.29 by substituting in the constraints 2.30 and 2.6, we get:
Um = (Y + w(1− r)− h)a(ηr)1−a (2.31)
Let us now briefly examine the slope of this utility function in terms of r and h -
dr
dh
. Totally differentiating 2.31, we get:
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{[Y + w(1− r)− h]a(1− a)[ηr]−aη + [ηr]1−aa[Y + w(1− r)− h]a−1[−w]}dr
+ {[ηr]1−a[Y + w(1− r)− h]a−1[−1]}dh = 0





(1− a)[Y + w(1− r)− h]− arw
(2.32)
Figure 2.5 shows the indifference curves depicting the principal’s utility function.
2.3.2.2 Maximization of the utility function subject to the participation
and incentive compatibility constraints




= [ηr]1−aa[Y +w(1−r)−h]a−1[−wrh−1]+[Y +w(1−r)−h]a(1−a)[ηr]−a[ηrh]
Simplifying:
−a[wrh + 1][ηr] + (1− a)[ηrh][Y + w(1− r)− h] = 0 (2.33)
Rearranging, we can write:
rh =
ar
(1− a)[Y + w(1− r)− h]− arw
(2.34)
2.34 essentially states that for the principal’s utility to be maximized, the slope
of his own indifference curve (2.32) must be equal to the slope of the agent’s best
response function.
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Now, since it will be difficult to arrive at an explicit solution for h, we will again
invoke the implicit function theorem. Rewriting 2.33,
G(h; a, Y, w, η) = −a[wrh + 1][ηr] + (1− a)[ηrh][Y + w(1− r)− h] = 0 (2.35)
Now, according to the implicit function theorem, in order to express h = h(a, Y, w, η),
two conditions must be met. First, in the neighborhood, N, of point (h0, Y0, w0, η0),
Ga, Gh, GY , Gw and Gη must be well-defined continuous partial derivatives. And,
second, in this neighborhood, Gh 6= 0. If these two conditions are met, h = h(Y,w, η)
is a meaningful expression, and importantly, we will know how equilibrium h changes
with a, Y , w and η.
Gh = −a{[ηr][wrhh]+ [wrh+1][ηrh]}+(1−a)η{[Y +w(1− r)−h]rhh+ rh[−wrh−1]}
Simplifying:
Gh = −ηrh[wrh + 1] + ηrhh{(1− a)[Y + w(1− r)− h]− arw}
Moreover, substituting in 2.34, we know that:






2.36 also satisfies the second-order condition for the principal’s utility maximiza-
tion.
Ga = −ηr[wrh + 1]− ηrh[Y + w(1− r)− h] < 0 (2.37)
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GY = (1− a)[ηrh] > 0 (2.38)
Gη = −ar[wrh + 1] + (1− a)rh[Y + w(1− r)− h]
Substituting in 2.34 and simplifying:
Gη = r(1− a) > 0 (2.39)
And finally,
Gw = −arhηr + (1− a)ηrh(1− r)
Simplifying:
Gw = ηrh(1− r − a)

> 0, ∀ 1− r > a
< 0, ∀ 1− r < a
(2.40)
Given that the conditions of the implicit function theorem are met, we can write:
h = (Y,w, η) (2.41)
















> 0, ∀ 1− r > a









2.3.3 Equilibrium: definition and characteristics
The Nash equilibrium of the model is characterized by a strategy profile where
both the principal and the agent are playing their mutual best-responses. Therefore:
r∗ = r(h∗; z) (2.46)
h∗ = h(r(h); a, Y, w, η) (2.47)
In Figure 2.6, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by the point a. Two important
features characterize this Nash equilibrium. First, this Nash equilibrium is Pareto
inefficient. Pareto efficiency is defined by the condition that from a given outcome, it
is impossible to make anyone better off without making at least one of them worse-
off. Specifically, for Pareto efficiency, the slopes of the agent’s and the principal’s
indifference curves must be tangential. However, from 2.15 and 2.20, we know that
along the best response function, the slope of the agent’s indifference curve is vertical.
And, from 2.34, we know that at the Nash equilibrium, the slope of the principal’s
indifference curve is equal to the slope of the best response function rh, which is
positive. The eye-shaped area, marked by b, in Figure 2.7 shows the potential strategy
profiles in which both the principal and the agent can do better than they do at the
Nash equilibrium.
Second, in equilibrium, the agent earns an economic rent. In other words, in
equilibrium, Vf > z. We know this from 2.21. The left-hand side of the equation is
negative, which is possible only if Vf − z > 0. This implies that since the agent is not
at her fall-back position, she has a positive cost of divorce. It is this positive cost of
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divorce that incentivizes her to work more at home than she would at her fall-back
position. And, since the 0 < r < 1, the marriage is a durable relationship that lasts
longer than a single period of time.
2.4 The role of increasing education: comparative statics
We examine five potential channels through which education may impact the Nash
equilibrium.
2.4.1 Productivity in household work
Let us say that education improves the agent’s productivity within the home. In
other words, let us assume η increases. From 2.45, we know that dh
dη
> 0. And, as h
increases, r increases. Consequently, the proportion of time allocated to wage labor
l declines.
2.4.2 Marriage market matching and increased other-household-income
Next, let us say that education improves the agent’s marriage market returns. In
other words, let us say that greater educational attainment allows her to marry a
wealthier principal with a greater Y , or household income not earned by the woman.
Again, from 2.43, we know that dh
dY
> 0. And an increase in h, causes an increase in
r which, in turn leads to a decline in the proportion of time allocated to wage labor.
2.4.3 Greater preference for household work
Let us say that greater educational attainment leads the agent to marry a principal
with a greater preference for household work. In other words, let us say a declines.
From 2.42, we know that dh
da
< 0. Therefore, a decline in a would cause an increase
in h, which in turn causes an increase in r, and a decline in the proportion of time
allocated to wage labor.
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2.4.4 Improved fall back position
Let us now assume that greater educational attainment improves a woman’s fall-
back position outside the marriage.
2.4.4.1 Change in the agent’s best response function
Rewriting the agent’s first-order-condition 2.21 and relaxing the assumption that
z = 0, we get:
d′l − d′r = −
[





Rewriting and simplifying, we get:
H(r, h; z) = uf − dl − dr − z(1− r) + (1− r)(d′l − d′r) = 0 (2.49)
In order for r = r(h; z), the conditions of the implicit function theorem must be
met. First, continuous partial derivative of H(r, h; z), Hr, Hh and Hz must exist.
Second, Hr 6= 0 in some neighborhood, N of (r0, h0, z0).
Hr = −(1− r)[d′′l + d′′r ] + z (2.50)
Let us assume that the z < (1− r)[d′′l + d′′r ], and therefore:
Hr = −(1− r)[d′′l + d′′r ] + z < 0 ∀ r 6= 1 (2.51)




f > 0 (2.52)
Hz = −(1− r) < 0 ∀ r 6= 1 (2.53)
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Now that the continuous partial derivative Hr, Hh and Hz are known to exist and
Hr 6= 0, the following expression becomes meaningful:
r = r(h; z) (2.54)
Moreover, using the implicit function rule, we can deduce that:
dr
dh










= rz = −
Hz
Hr
= − −(1− r)









{z − (1− r)[d′′l + d′′r ]}2
> 0 (2.57)
This essentially means that with an improvement in the agent’s fall-back position,
her incentive compatibility constraint shifts downward becoming steeper at every
point.
2.4.4.2 Change in the principal’s maximization problem
With an improvement in the agent’s fall-back position, the incentive compatibility
constraint faced by the principal has changed. He will now revise the h offered.
Rewriting 2.35 after relaxing the z = 0 assumption:
G(h; a, Y, w, η, z) = −a[wrh + 1][ηr] + (1− a)[ηrh][Y + w(1− r)− h] = 0 (2.58)
For the implicit function, we now need additionally that Gz must exist:
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Gz = −ηrz[a + wrh] + ηrhz{(1 − a)[Y + w(1 − r) − h] − arw} (2.59)
Rewriting by substituting in 2.34, we know that:












From the analysis so far we know that with an improvement in the agent’s fall-back
position, her incentive compatibility constraint shifts downward becoming steeper
at every point. We also know that, knowing this, the principal increases his h in
equilibrium to compensate. It is unclear, at this stage, if the r in the new equilibrium
will be higher or lower than the r in the new equilibrium.
r would be lower in the new equilibrium if
∣∣∣∣dhdz rh














− ηrh[1 + wrh]
∗ rh
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < |rz| (2.63)
And for 2.63 to be true, we would need the following inequality to be true, which
seems arbitrarily specific.
rhzrh − rhhrz < 0 (2.64)
Whether an improvement in the woman’s fall-back position will result in a greater
participation in work outside the house, therefore, depends on the shape of the agent’s
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utility function. What is important to note here is that an improvement in the agent’s
fall-back position need not increase her participation in work outside the house. What
it will definitely do, as per the model, is increase h, the share of the household income
she can bargain for within the house.
2.4.5 Changing job-related preferences
Next, let us assume that the agent’s disutility from wage work rises for the kind
of work that is available. There is, then, a positive shift in dl. Whether this shift
causes l to increase or decrease depends on the shape of the utility function. Let us
consider two cases.
Case 1: Let us first consider a case where:











Substituting 2.65 into the 2.20 and re-writing:
J(r, h; ū) = uf + (1− r)(d′l − d′r)− dl(1− r; ū)− dr = 0 (2.67)
By the implicit function theorem, in order for the expression r = r(h; ū) to be
meaningful in some neighborhood of (ro, h0, ū0), we need that the partial derivatives
Jr, Jh and Jū must exist and that Jr 6= 0 in this neighborhood.




















It may seem counter-intuitive that a positive shift in the disutility from l causes a
decline in the best-response r at every level of h. The reason this happens is that with
a positive shift in the disutility from l, there is an overall decline in the total value
from the marriage for the woman. This means that there is a decline in the marginal
benefit of increasing r. (Remember - from equation 2.21 - that the marginal benefit
of increasing r - the right-hand side of the equation - is the reduced probability of
divorce multiplied by the total value of the marriage to the agent.)
The slope of the best response function does not change. It merely shifts down-
ward.
Given that there has been a shift in the agent’s best response function, the prin-
cipal revises the h offered. To see how he revises h, we can rewrite 2.35 to include
ū:
G(h; ū, a, Y, w, η) = −a[wrh + 1][ηr] + (1− a)[ηrh][Y + w(1− r)− h] = 0 (2.73)
Differentiating with respect to ū:
Gū = −a[wrh + 1]ηrū − (1− a)ηrhwrū > 0 (2.74)
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In response to a shift in the best response function, therefore, the principal raises
h. Whether this leads to an overall increase or decrease in r depends on the specific
shape of the agent’s utility function.
Case 2: Let us now consider a case where:




















The best response function shifts upward only if Jū > 0. And then again, the
analysis is the same as when the fall-back position improves, but in the opposite
direction. A shift in dl causes an upward shift in the best response function and
the best response function becomes flatter at every point. In response, the principal
reduces his offer of h. Again, whether this results in an increase in r in equilibrium
depends on the shape of the agent’s utility function. What we do know for certain is
that the amount of h she gets declines.
2.5 Conclusion
Going back to the motivating question of this paper, what explains the negative re-
lationship between educational attainment and workforce participation among women
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in India? Based on the theoretical model and in support of the empirical literature
on this question, I find that improved marriage market returns to education, greater
productivity within the household and a greater household preference for the agent’s
unpaid work (see Essay 1) do explain the negative relationship between educational
attainment and workforce participation.
Two of the potential factors that I explore show ambiguous results. If education
improves a woman’s fall back position outside of marriage, this does not necessarily
increase the probability of her joining the workforce. Similarly, if education increases
a woman’s preference for the kind of white-collar jobs that are harder to find, this
does not necessarily decrease her probability of joining the workforce. These factors
do not have as much of an impact because the principal has the first-mover advantage
and is able to account for the agent’s preferences and bargaining power in making his
offer.
The result about the role of bargaining power is insightful. It suggests that while
education improves a woman’s overall condition within the household - greater bar-
gaining power and a greater share of the household resources - it need not result in
her working more outside of the house. This, along with some of the factors outlined
shows that investment in women’s education is not an irrational decision from the
point of view of the woman. It bears positive returns, just not in the labor market.
In conclusion, this model, although a simple modification of a principal-agent
(employer-employee) model is still able to explain much of what we see in India with
women’s education and workforce participation. Importantly, it deviates from the
standard assumption that a woman’s time is divided between labor for a wage and
leisure, focuses on the asymmetric information about household work between the
man and the woman and relies on the positive cost of divorce faced by the woman as
an incentive for her to perform household work.
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2.6 Figures




































































Note: This figure only includes women in the working age population i.e. between 16 and 64 years
of age.
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Figure 2.2. A classification of models of the household
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Note: Iso-value curves (or indifference curves) depict a constant value of the relationship to the
agent. The agent’s best response function or the incentive compatibility constraint is the dotted
curve.
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Note: Point a, depicts the Nash equilibrium. Here, the principal is on his highest indifference curve
possible, given the agent’s best response function. And, the agent is on her best response function.
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Note: The eye-shaped area, marked by b shows the pareto improving lens or potential strategy
profiles in which both the principal and the agent can do better than they do at the Nash
equilibrium.
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Note: r is relatively more valuable to the agent because either (a) his own income is greater; or (b)
she is more productive within the household; or (c) nature/social status of the household.
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Note: The best response function shifts downward because on an improvement in the agent’s
bargaining power.
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Note: Source - Desai and Joshi (2019). The figures are calculated from quinquennial rounds of the
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) survey using the Usual Status criterion. ‘Usual
status’ refers to the activity performed by an individual for the majority of the past 365 days from
the day of the survey.
84
CHAPTER 3
DOES ECONOMICS MAKE YOU SELFISH?
3.1 Introduction
The concern that ‘economics makes you selfish’ is widely held. From opinion pieces
in The New York Times (Bauman 2011) to popular broadcasts on the US National
Public Radio (NPR) (Vedantam 2017) and the BBC (Stafford 2013), mass media has
popularized the idea that studying economics has a detrimental effect on generosity
and cooperativeness. Similarly, the argument goes, studying economics may also
promote policy opinions typically considered conservative (Stigler 1959; Colander
2005; O’Roark and Wood 2011).
There is some evidence (cited in the next section) that economics students are
more conservative and self-regarding than their peers. But an important unresolved
question is to what extent this reflects differential selection into economics rather
than a causal effect of economics education.
To address this question we use a transparent difference-in-differences strategy to
identify the causal effect of a one-semester intermediate microeconomics course on
students’ social preferences and policy opinions. We administered an online survey
at the beginning and at the end of the semester to five classes – four intermediate
microeconomics classes and one non-economics class as a control. We used a Trust
Game (TG), a triple Dictator Game (DG) with charities in the role of receiver, and
two incentivized tasks eliciting subjects’ expectations about the behavior of others in
the same games.
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Subjects’ behavior in these games provides a measure of the extent to which an
individual deviates from the (Nash-equilibrium) prediction of self-interest (which we
term deviation from self interest, or DFSI). Our belief-elicitation tasks measure the
extent to which subjects expect others to deviate from self-interest. We also included
questions eliciting students’ policy preferences on topics such as economic and envi-
ronmental regulations, trust in government, market efficiency, and immigration.
Our sample includes undergraduate students enrolled at the University of Mas-
sachusetts Amherst. The intermediate microeconomics courses include two courses
following a standard curriculum. Because we know that differences in course content
can have substantial long term effects on social and political attitudes (as documented,
for example, by Cantoni et al. 2017, who study a recent curriculum reform in Chi-
nese schools) we also look at the possible effects of different content of the economics
courses. Our sample also includes students in an intermediate microeconomics course
that, while listed in the course catalogue as identical to the conventional courses,
devotes substantial attention to a variety of other topics: social preferences, asym-
metric information, incomplete contracts, game theory, fairness and Pareto-efficiency
as normative criteria, the benefits of cooperation (e.g. in commons tragedies), and
competition. We call this course Post-Walrasian.1 We also include students in a
fourth course that is predominantly conventional but with some exposure to social
preferences. Our control subjects are in a large course on nutrition.
We find that a one-semester intermediate microeconomics course has little to no
effect on experimental measures of social preferences or on expectations about other
people’s social preferences. Our estimates of the effect on measures of altruism and
reciprocity are close to zero and do not differ across the differing content of the
courses. We also find little evidence of an effect on the students’ policy preferences
1The course was taught by one of the authors of this paper (Girardi) using the pre-publication
draft of a textbook written by two of us (Bowles and Halliday).
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or political orientations. The one exception concerns immigration: studying inter-
mediate microeconomics (whatever the course content) seems to make students less
opposed to highly restrictive immigration policies.
3.2 Economics and preferences: theory and evidence
Theoretically, studying economics might shift behavior towards self-interest through
three main mechanisms: exposure, moral wiggle room, and reducing cognitive disso-
nance.
First, consider the powerful effect of mere exposure. By exposure we mean the
introduction to and repeated interaction with an idea. In particular, a student learns
about self-interest in economics courses, and is repeatedly shown the many ways in
which rational, self-interested actors behave (and is not similarly exposed to other
ways in which people – or other relevant economic agents – might behave). The effect
of exposure on social learning has been well documented (Zajonc 1965; Murphy and
Zajonc 1993; Murphy, Monahan, and Zajonc 1995; Birch and Marlin 1982). Pre-
senting self-interest as the norm for human behavior might thus have the unintended
effect of making students more likely to adopt that norm themselves.
Second, given what they learn, economics students may be provided moral wiggle
room for what they would otherwise consider immoral behavior, and a way to rec-
oncile their own self-interest with a positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely
2008; Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007). How might learning microeconomics produce
these results? In microeconomics, students learn to demonstrate that in a perfectly
competitive market, the non-cooperative pursuit of self-regarding preferences results
in a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. This may provide a moral and social justification for
self-interested behavior. A student who believes that self-interest promotes efficiency
will be able to maintain a positive and pro-social self-perception while at the same
time acting selfishly, when she would otherwise see self-interest as immoral or con-
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trary to social norms (Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013; Shalvi et al. 2015; Dana, Weber,
and Kuang 2007).
Finally, it has long been recognized in social psychology that actions can affect
preferences as part of a cognitive dissonance reduction response (Festinger 1957;
Ariely and Norton 2008). The ‘effort justification’ variant of this body of theory
proposes that, as Xiao and Houser (2018) put it ‘when one engages in a strenuous
activity that one would not typically choose, one develops the perception that the
activity is attractive in order to justify the effort.’ By this reasoning, the effort that
economics students spend choosing a strategy to maximize their payoff in a game,
or a level of output to maximize the profits of a firm, or their market basket to
maximize their self-regarding utility, could induce a shift towards more self-regarding
preferences.
Empirically, a substantial literature has appeared in support of the idea that
economists are more self interested.2 There is also some (more limited) evidence that
economists tend to hold more conservative policy preferences.3 These studies do not
identify a causal impact of studying economics, as distinct from a selection effect
concerning who chooses to study economics.
A much smaller set of papers has addressed our question, namely, is there a causal
effect of the study of economics on social values and policy preferences? Two identi-
fication strategies have been deployed. The first is to observe students’ attitudes or
behavior over time, contrasting those in economics courses with those taking other
courses. Frey and Meier (2003) study (real-world) giving behavior of students in eco-
2 Included are Marwell and Ames (1981), Carter and Irons (1991), Wang, Malhotra, and
Murnighan (2011), Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) and Rubinstein (2006). A few studies have
instead found economists to be more generous or less opportunistic than others (Yezer, Goldfarb,
and Poppen 1996). Konow (2019) shows that providing ethics instruction to students taking an
economics course can increase generosity, though economics and business majors are less generous
on average than other majors.
3 For example O’Roark and Wood (2011) and Colander (2005).
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nomics and other courses over their period at university. They find no evidence that
studying economics reduces contributions. Bauman and Rose (2011), using a similar
design, find no evidence that taking economics courses reduces the contributions of
economic majors to a public interest group. However, they find a negative effect on
the contributions of non-economics majors who take economics courses.
The second strategy is to implement a controlled experiment, briefly exposing
randomly selected subjects to economic concepts or language, and a control group to
an exposure that is otherwise similar but unrelated to economics, and then observing
the difference in the before-after measures of interest. Ifcher and Zarghamee (2018)
randomly assign some experimental subjects to the treatment – economics exposure
– by means of language affirming “(1) that all individuals are self-interested and
(2) that all individuals attempt to maximize their payments.” Subjects then play
incentivized games. The authors find that compared to subjects exposed to non-
economic language, the exposure to economics shifts behavior towards self-interest.
In another experiment, Molinsky, Grant, and Margolis (2012) asked mid-career
business leaders acting as “managers” to convey to a “subordinate,” some bad news,
for example reassignment to an undesirable location or dissatisfaction with the sub-
ordinate’s job performance. Immediately prior to this, managers had been randomly
selected to create a sensible phrase from a scrambled bunch of words, some of which
contained economic content (for example, in unscrambled form: “analyse costs and
benefits”), and some that did not (the control). In communicating the bad news to
the subordinate the managers who had been exposed to the economic words experi-
enced less empathy and conveyed less compassion to the subordinate than did those
in the control group.
Our study belongs to the strand of literature that uses a difference-in-differences
approach, comparing medium-term changes in students’ behavior and beliefs among
those with a sustained exposure to economics teaching and those without. The two
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other studies of this type (Frey and Meier 2003; Bauman and Rose 2011) measure
a single outcome – giving behavior – in a natural setting. Our study draws upon a
wide range of incentivized experimentally-elicited behaviors and beliefs, and measures
of political orientation and policy opinions. Moreover, we are the first to study the
effects of different course content.
3.3 Research design
We administered an online survey at the beginning and at the end of the semester
to a group of undergraduate students enrolled in four intermediate microeconomics
courses and one non-social science course. The survey includes questions on personal
characteristics and policy preferences, and four economic games with real monetary
stakes – a Trust Game (TG), a Triple Dictator Game with charities (DG), and two
belief elicitation questions about the behavior of others in the same games.
We use these to obtain individual-level measures of ‘deviation from self-interest’
due to generosity and reciprocity, and beliefs about the social preferences of others.
Participants completed the survey at a time of their convenience from a link in our
invitation email.
3.3.1 Sample and courses
Students from four different intermediate microeconomics courses and from one
course outside of the social sciences comprise our sample. A course in ‘Nutrition and
Metabolism’ serves as a control non-economics course. The economics courses vary:
two courses (which we call Conventional I and Conventional II) are fairly standard
intermediate microeconomics courses using Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2012) and Perloff
(2011); a third (Post Walrasian) course uses Bowles and Halliday (2019) and focuses
on strategic interactions and contractual incompleteness alongside standard topics of
optimization (crucially it contains behavioral experiments and models of social pref-
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erences); finally, the fourth course (Conventional plus social preferences), is an online
course using Frank (2008). The four intermediate microeconomics courses all had
the same enrollment prerequisites and identical description in the online enrollment
system.
Figure 3.1 clarifies why we hypothesize that different economics courses could lead
to different outcomes. It shows the location of the textbooks used in the intermediate
microeconomics courses under investigation in a simplex covering three important and
over-arching ideas in modern economics (Bowles et al. 2019 refer to these ideas as
“meta-topics” as they are aggregations of underlying sets of topics).4 The location of a
given textbook within the simplex identifies a book’s relative emphasis. For example,
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2012) and Perloff (2011) place their emphasis on market
structure and competition. Varian (2014), by way of contrast, puts greater emphasis
on individual constrained maximization, whereas Bowles and Halliday (2019) places a
greater weight on strategic interactions, contractual incompleteness, and bargaining.
With respect to the content of each book, one can also compare the coverage of how
economists conceive of and teach preferences. In each book, a model of constrained
utility maximization is the main model of individual decision-making. Frank (2008)
and Bowles and Halliday (2019) teach standard self-interested preferences while also
explaining the evidence for alternatives to self-interest, such as altruism, difference
aversion, conditional cooperation, and so on. Both books explain the evidence from
results in experimental economics that underlie the alternative models of preferences.
3.3.2 Experimental design
The survey administered to our sample includes standard demographic and aca-
demic information, questions eliciting students’ policy opinions, incentivized choice
4 Specifically, Bowles et al. (2019) use topic modeling – a machine learning algorithm used to
analyze texts (Gentzkow, Kelly, and Taddy 2019) – to identify three important meta-topics that are
at the heart of microeconomics research.
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experiments (economic games), and incentivized belief-elicitation questions regarding
a subject’s beliefs about the behavior of others in the same games. The wording of all
the policy questions is available in Appendix B.1.4, with topics covering immigration,
the functioning of markets, government regulation, and climate change.
The survey asked participants to play four incentivized games: a Triple Dictator
Game (DG), a Trust Game (TG), and two belief-elicitation tasks about the behavior
of other participants in these games. The order in which the two games were presented
was randomized: each participant was equally likely to play the DG first or the TG
first. After completion of the survey, we randomly selected one of the four games for
payment.
In the Triple Dictator Game (DG) with charities the respondent is allocated $10
and given the possibility to donate a portion to a local non-profit charitable orga-
nization from a list of three. The list included non-partisan, non-controversial, and
apolitical organizations. Any amount donated would be tripled.5
We then ask the subject to guess the average contribution of the other participants.
The subject’s payoff depended on how close they were to the actual average: their
payoff was $12 minus the absolute value of the guessing error. The guessing error is
defined as the difference between a subject’s guess and the average donation of all
other respondents.
In the Trust Game (TG), participants are anonymously and randomly paired
(Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). Within each pair, one player is randomly as-
signed the role of first mover, while the other is the second mover. The first mover
is allocated $10. She must transfer a share of this $10 of her choice to the second
5 This matching subsidy creates a strong incentive for altruistic individuals to donate through the
experiment. This addresses a major concern with the DG with charities: in the absence of matching,
altruistic participants might personally send a share of their payoff to the same charity or a different
one post-experiment (Knowles and Servátka 2015, p. 57). It is also consistent with Dictator Games
run alongside Trust Games in previous literature (Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov 2006).
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mover (the amount sent may be zero if the first mover chooses so). The first mover
is also informed that whatever she sends will be tripled by the experimenter. Once
the first mover chooses a value, the experimenter will triple it and transfer it to the
second mover. The second mover is then told to make a similar choice: transfer some
share of the now-tripled money back to the first mover (the amount given back may
be zero, should the second mover choose so).
Subjects played the games asynchronously with matching occurring later. Each
subject specified how they would play both roles (first mover and second mover)
and we used the strategy method for the case of the choices as the second mover.
Each participant was therefore asked to specify (1) how much they would send as
first mover; (2) how much they would send back as second mover for each possible
transfer of the first mover in whole numbers.
To determine payoffs, each participant was then (after completion of the surveys)
randomly paired with another participant.6 In each pair, one was randomly selected
as first-mover and the other as second-mover. We performed the random matching of
participants one week after the opening of the survey (including all who had responded
within the first week), and then at the end of the survey (including all participants
who filled the survey during the second week). In this way, we guaranteed that
each participant would receive her payoff within one week after survey completion.
Subjects also performed a belief-elicitation task, similar to the one regarding behavior
in the DG and with the same payoff rule, with respect to Player 1’s behavior in the
Trust Game.7
Respondents also stated their best guesses about the average responses as Player
2 of all other participants, for each possible amount received from Player 1. Their
6Participants were matched across the entire sample, not within each treatment group.
7While we included this belief-elicitation question in the survey for symmetry, we will not use it
in estimation, because the behavior of Player 1 in the TG does not have a clear interpretation in
terms of deviation from self-interest.
93
payoff was then based on the accuracy of their guesses. A subject’s payoff is $12
minus the subject’s average guessing error. To define the average guessing error, we
take the absolute value of the difference between the subject’s guess and the average
amount transferred as Player 2 by all other players, for each possible amount received
from Player 1, and then take an average across all possible amounts received from
Player 1.
3.3.3 Experimental measures of social preferences
We use the four experiments to obtain two measures of self-interest, a measure of
reciprocity, and two measures of beliefs about others’ self-interest. Each measure is
standardized such that it falls in the range [0, 1].
First, we measure how much behavior deviates from self interest (DFSI). For
example, in the Dictator Game if a player gives $10 and the self-interested choice
would be 0, then this amount would be divided by 10 (the maximum possible transfer)
to give a measure of 1; if a player gives 5, their DFSI measure would be 0.5, and so
on. In the Trust Game, if Player 2 returns to Player 1 everything she receives, their
DFSI is 1; if they return half the amount received, their DFSI is 0.5, and so on.
Second, we measure how much a subject believes the behavior of others will deviate
from self-interest (what we call guess DFSI ). This is the same as the above measure,
but based on the elicited beliefs.
Third, we measure reciprocity using behavior by Player 2 in the TG. Specifically,
we look at the covariation between the share of her endowment that Player 1 transfers
to Player 2 and the share of this transfer passed back by Player 2 to Player 1. If
Player 2 increases the share she returns one-to-one with the share she receives, their
measured reciprocity is 1. A Player 2 who returns the same share, regardless of the
transfer received, has a reciprocity measure of 0. We provide further details about
each measure in Appendix B.2.
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3.3.4 Policy preferences
We aggregate the information contained in the students’ evaluation of the 11 policy
statements into a smaller set of variables. We employ two alternative approaches to
do this.
The first approach uses a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the four
main principal components. We give them interpretative labels, based on the topics of
the statements to which they give larger (positive or negative) weights. We interpret
the first component as positioning a subject’s policy views on a left-right scale (‘Left-
right’). The second component appears to measure support for and positive view of
free markets (‘Pro-market’). The third and fourth are labeled, respectively, ‘Libertar-
ian’ and ‘Communitarian’. See Appendix B.3 for details, including the weights that
each component gives to each statement.
The second approach takes simple averages of scores in statements which concern
the same topic. Specifically, we consider five indexes. They are calculated as simple
sums of scores in questions which share a common topic covering five areas: pro-
market, pro-government intervention, pro-green policies, trust in government, and
immigration restrictiveness. Each sum of individual scores is divided by its maximum
possible value, so that all indexes range from -1 to +1. Details on these indexes are
provided in Appendix B.3.
3.3.5 Estimation strategy
We estimate the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on
our outcomes of interest using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy. We employ
the following fixed-effects regression:
yit = αi + γPostt + βEconi ∗ Postt + uit (3.1)
95
where i indexes individuals; t indexes the survey round (t = 0 for beginning-of-
semester and t = 1 for end-of-semester); y is an outcome of interest; αi captures
individual fixed-effects; Post is an indicator equal to 1 if t = 1 and 0 otherwise; Econ
equals 1 if the respondent is enrolled in an intermediate microeconomics course, 0
otherwise. The β coefficient provides the difference-in-differences estimate of the
effect of the ‘intermediate microeconomics’ treatment. Standard errors are clustered
at the individual level.8
To capture possible heterogeneity in effects based on the specific approach to eco-
nomics being taught, we also examine the effect of ‘Conventional’ and ‘Post Walrasian’
microeconomics courses separately, using the following specification:
yit = αi + γPostt +β
WConventionali ∗Postt +βPWPostWalrasi ∗Postt +uit (3.2)
where Conventional is a dummy equal to 1 if a student is enrolled in a conventional
intermediate microeconomics course; PostWalras is a dummy for being enrolled in
what we called the Post-Walrasian intermediate microeconomics course.9 βW is our
8Ideally, we would want to cluster standard errors at the treatment group level (economics vs.
non-economics students). This, however, is not possible, as it would result in only two clusters.
Also clustering at the course level would result in a too small number of clusters for reliable statis-
tical inference (we would have five clusters, four of which are treated). The standard Liang-Zeger
clustering adjustment tends to perform poorly (severely underestimating standard errors) with a
small number of clusters (Cameron and Miller 2015). This problem cannot be solved by using wild-
bootstrap methods to adjust for clustering: although they are robust to a small number of clusters,
they cannot be applied in a difference-in-differences setting in which treatment is assigned at the
cluster level and there are few treated clusters (MacKinnon and Webb 2018); in this setting, both
restricted (WCR) and unrestricted (WCU) versions of the wild-bootstrap method would provide
severely biased estimates of standard errors (MacKinnon and Webb 2018). We therefore cluster
standard errors at the individual level. Inability to account for higher-level clustering of error terms
is a limitation of this study, which is imposed by the structure of our data.
9The courses that we called Conventional I and Conventional II are included in the ‘Conventional’
treatment; the post-Walrasian course represents the PostWalras treatment. We exclude from this
‘disaggregated’ portion of the analysis the Conventional + SP course, because it is not clear in which
of the two groups it should be included. All the results we will present are robust to including the
Conventional + SP course either in the Conventional or in the PostWalras treatment.
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estimate of the effect of the ‘conventional microeconomics’ treatment, while βPW
provides the estimate of the effect of the ‘Post-Walrasian microeconomics’ treatment.
The excluded category is always the non-economics control group.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Summary statistics and consistency checks
Table 3.1 summarizes sample and sub-sample sizes and participation rates. 202
students responded to both rounds of the survey.10 Participation rates are quite high,
ranging from 52% in the Conventional + SP course to 92.5% in the Post-Walrasian
course. In the overall sample, the participation rate is 68.5%.
Table 3.2 reports the demographic distribution of participants and the share of
economics and business majors across courses. Almost all participants are between
19 and 25 years old. Among participants from the nutrition course, who constitute
our control group, there is no economics or business major, subjects are almost evenly
distributed between the 19-21 and 22-25 age categories, and the share of women is
nearly 91%. Among economics students in our sample, the share of economics or
business majors is 93%, a large majority (84%) is in the 19-21 age category, and the
share of women is only 27%. This is broadly in line with national gender ratios. As
long as the stark differences in gender composition between treated and control groups
are absorbed by the individual fixed effects, they should not affect our estimates. They
would, however, be potentially problematic if male and female students displayed
differential trends in social preferences and policy opinions. We devote particular
attention to assessing systematic gender differences in (changes in) behavior, and
present robustness tests that estimate our main regressions separately by gender.
10We disregard observations for students who only participated in the first round or only in the
second round as we need observations from both survey rounds.
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Appendix Figures B.4 to B.8 plot frequency distributions for our measures of social
preferences before treatment, and for their changes over the course of the semester,
by gender. According to all measures, around 40% of respondents did not change
their level of altruism/reciprocity at all, 20% displayed only small changes, and 20%
displayed large changes. The distribution of the outcomes, and of their changes during
the semester, displays little systematic differences by gender.
The measures of generosity from the DG and from the TG are positively and
significantly, although not strongly, correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient
of 0.18 (p = 0.0003). Expectations about other people’s generosity from the two
games are also positively and significantly but not strongly correlated, with a Pearson
correlation coefficient of 0.11 (p = 0.0315).
3.4.2 Effect on social preferences and beliefs
We start by simply looking at the distribution of changes in our outcomes of
interest during the semester, comparing economics and non-economics students. As
shown in Figure 3.2, changes during the semester are distributed similarly in the two
groups, suggesting little effect of economics on social preferences and beliefs. This
result is confirmed by our difference-in-differences estimations, which we now describe.
Table 3.3 reports our baseline difference-in-differences estimates of the average
effect of intermediate microeconomics courses on students’ social preferences and
beliefs about social preferences. The top panel of Figure 3.3 visually summarizes the
key results. To interpret effect sizes, we report estimates of the effect of economics
using the measures of social preferences and beliefs as defined in Section 3.3.3 (which
have an interpretation in terms of percentage changes in generosity/reciprocity) and
after standardizing each measure to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1
(so coefficients are interpreted in terms of standard deviations).
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Four main results stand out. First, average initial (pre-treatment) levels of al-
truism are quite high in both groups, resulting in large deviations from the Nash
equilibrium predictions of self-interest. This is shown in the top panel of Table 3.3,
which reports pre-treatment averages for economics and nutrition students. On aver-
age, participants donated more than 60% of their endowment in the Dictator Game
with charities and passed back almost 40% of their initial payoff when acting as Player
2 in the Trust Game. Average levels of reciprocity are positive and moderately strong.
For a unit increase in the share passed on by Player 1, the share passed back by Player
2 increases by approximately 0.3.
Second, and consistent with most previous literature, economics students display
slightly lower levels of generosity in both games. However, they display higher levels of
reciprocity. This is shown in the second panel of Table 3.3, which reports a measure of
selection into economics: the difference in pre-treatment averages between economics
and nutrition students. The blue bars in Figure 3.3a display this measure of selection
bias, expressing it in terms of standard deviations. The difference in generosity is
relatively small (5 percentage points lower for economics students in the DG, and 2.8
percentage points lower in the TG) and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
difference at any conventional significance level. Pre-treatment beliefs about other
students’ generosity do not appear to differ much between economics and the control
group (slightly lower for economics students in the DG, but slightly higher in the TG).
Regarding reciprocity, for each unit increase in the share of the endowment passed
on by Player 1, economics students increase the share they pass back as Player 2 by
0.09 additional units relative to nutrition students (s.e. 0.05).
Third, social preferences and beliefs about social preferences remain stable for
both economics and non-economics students. The third panel of Table 3.3 and Figure
3.3a display changes during the semester. They show that both economics and non-
economics students tend to display stability of social preferences and of beliefs about
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others’ social preferences. Changes in average levels of altruism and reciprocity and
in beliefs during the semester are small in both groups.
Fourth – and most important – economics education seems to have little effect
on social preferences. The fourth panel of Table 3.3 reports the estimated effect of
intermediate microeconomics (obtained through the estimation of equation 3.1 in our
sample). The fifth panel reports the same estimated average effect after standardizing
the outcome variables, to help interpreting effect sizes. Standardized effects are also
reported in Figure 3.3a.
The estimated average treatment effect of intermediate microeconomics on social
preferences is close to zero. The estimated effect on generosity in the DG amounts
to +1.4 percentage points (with a standard error of 6 pp), or 0.04 standard devia-
tions (s.e. 0.17). The estimated effect on generosity in the TG is +0.2 percentage
points (s.e. 2 pp), or 0.015 standard deviations (s.e. 0.14). The estimated effect on
reciprocity is -0.04 standard deviations (s.e. 0.15).
When using Player 2 behavior in the TG to measure generosity, the null effect is
also quite precisely estimated. We can rule out at the 0.05 significance level a decrease
in generosity bigger than 4.6 percentage points or 0.3 standard deviations.
With respect to beliefs, Figure 3.3(a) shows that the estimated effect of economics
on beliefs about other people’s generosity in the DG is practically zero. On generosity
in the TG, however, the effect of economics on beliefs is -0.22 standard deviations (s.e.
0.146). Though imprecisely estimated, the effect suggests that economics students
may reduce their belief in others’ generosity in trusting interactions.
To assess whether these results are affected by the gender differences between the
treatment and control groups, in Appendix B.9 we estimate the effect of intermediate
microeconomics including only female students, obtaining similar results .11
11The total number of female students in our sample is 84, and they are equally distributed
between the control and the treated group (42 in each). We are not able to estimate effects for
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To capture possible differences in treatment effects based on course content, we
separate the impact of different course curricula. Results are summarized in the
top panel of Figure 3.6. More details are provided in Appendix Tables B.2. We
find little to no difference. The estimated effect of both conventional and Post-
Walrasian variants of intermediate microeconomics is close to zero and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no effect at any conventional significance level, across all
the experimental measures of social preferences and beliefs.
3.4.3 Effects on policy preferences
Tables 3.4 and 3.5, and the bottom panels of Figure 3.3, report our results about
the effects of intermediate microeconomics courses on students’ policy preferences. In
particular, Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3(a) use the four principal components detected
by our PCA; Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3(b) use simple averages of statements sharing
a common topic. For symmetry with the analysis of social preferences, we report
estimated effects in terms of average changes in the indexes and in terms of standard
deviations. Below, we focus on the standardized measures.
We first consider our measure of selection into economics: the difference in pre-
treatment average policy opinions between economics students and the control group.
On average, students enrolled in intermediate microeconomics are substantially and
significantly more ‘pro-market’. This is found both in the PCA analysis and in the
analysis using simple averages. The ‘pro-market’ component from the PCA is higher
by 0.45 standard deviations for economics students (s.e. 0.18); the average agreement
with statements expressing a positive view of markets is higher by 0.48 standard
deviations (s.e. 0.17). After accounting for multiple hypothesis testing through the
Westfall and Young (1993) method, the adjusted p-value for the selection effect in
males only, because there are only 4 male students in the nutrition course that serves as a control
group (Table 3.2).
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the ‘pro-market’ variable is 0.052 for the PCA component and 0.032 for the simple
average.12 Economics students also display a higher pre-treatment average for the
‘Left-right’ component, by 0.19 standard deviations. This means that they are, on
average, politically to the right of the control group students. This difference is, how-
ever, imprecisely estimated (s.e. 0.16) and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
selection effect for this variable. Selection effects are rather small and indistinguish-
able from zero for all other measures of policy preferences.
We then turn to our difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of interme-
diate microeconomics. We find no effect on any of the four principal components
that summarize students’ policy positions, nor on their average opinions on free mar-
kets, government intervention, and green policies. We do, however, find effects on
their opinions on immigration policy: economics seems to make students favor more
restrictive immigration. Specifically, their support for the statement ‘Immigrants
from other countries should be prohibited except where it can be shown that they
will contribute to the quality of life of the current resident population ’ (Statement
Q9, the only component question of the ‘immigration restriction’ index) increases by
0.33 standard deviations (s.e. 0.13) among economics students relative to the control
group. After accounting for multiple hypothesis testing through the Westfall and
Young (1993) method, the adjusted p-value for this effect is 0.082.13
To put the effect we have found on students’ opinions on immigration policy in
context, it is worth noting that at the beginning of the semester economics students (as
well as the control group) on average disagree with the restrictive view of immigration
12 This result is robust to using alternative methods to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
Specifically, the adjusted p-values are respectively 0.053 and 0.022 if using the Bonferroni-Holm
method, and 0.052 and 0.022 when using the Sidak-Holm method. We use the ‘wyoung’ command
in STATA (Jones, Molitor, and Reif 2018) in order to perform adjustment for multiple hypothesis
testing.
13 Using the Bonferroni-Holm method produces an adjusted p-value of 0.073; the Sidak-Holm
method gives an adjusted p-value of 0.071.
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(first panel of Table 3.5). The average pre-treatment value for the ‘immigration
restrictiveness index’ is -0.36 for both economics and non-economics students (on a
scale that ranges from -1 to 1). The index increases on average by 0.093 (s.e. 0.047)
during the semester for economics students. Notwithstanding this significant increase,
at the end of the semester economics students remain on average substantially more
likely to disagree than to agree with the restrictionist view of immigration.
There also seems to be a modest negative effect of economics on trust in govern-
ment, but it is quite imprecisely estimated. Trust in the government of the State of
Massachusetts decreases by 0.2 standard deviations among economics students rel-
ative to the control group (s.e. 0.17). However, a 95% confidence interval for this
effect cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero effect, and, after accounting for mul-
tiple hypothesis testing through the Westfall and Young (1993) method, the p-value
for this effect is 0.64.
While the aggregations we have performed allow us to convey results in a more
compact and informative way, in Appendix Figure B.13 we also look at effects on each
single policy statement, reaching similar conclusions: there is no substantial impact
on any single policy statement, except for the effect on immigration policy.
Results are similar when including only female students, so they do not appear to
be driven by gender differences between the treated and the control groups (Appendix
B.9).
The estimated effects on policy preferences also appear to display little difference
based on course content. The bottom panel of Figure 3.6 reports separately the
effect of different microeconomics courses. Most importantly, the positive effect on
the ‘immigration-restrictive’ variable is visible in both the ‘conventional’ courses and
the ‘post-Walrasian’ one. There is no discernible effect on any other policy opinion
in any of the two types of courses. The only significant difference in results is in
selection effects: the higher pre-treatment values for the pro-market variable and the
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‘Left-right’ components among economics students seem to be mostly driven by the
courses with a conventional curriculum.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the question ‘does economics make you selfish?’ In particular,
we estimate the impact of semester-long intermediate microeconomics courses on
social preferences, policy opinions, and beliefs about other people’s social preferences.
The economics students in our sample start the semester with a more favorable
opinion of market competition and relatively more conservative policy views, and
display lower generosity and higher reciprocity in experimental games. But other than
economics students being substantially more ”pro market”, these effects of differential
selection into economics are relatively small and imprecisely estimated.
We found little to no causal effect of studying economics on social preferences and
beliefs about other people’s social preferences. Differences in these outcomes between
economics students and the control group did not change during the semester, and
are also unaffected by the content of the economics course. We find no effect on an
aggregate “left-right” measure of political positions, nor on views of markets, govern-
ment intervention, and green policies. The sole evidence of a substantial effect is that
economics students come to express less opposition to a highly restrictive statement
about immigration policy. This effect is economically relevant, but only marginally
significant when accounting for multiple-hypothesis testing. Further research will be
needed to assess the robustness of this result, and, should it prove robust, evaluate
the mechanisms.
Overall, our results are thus consistent with the two other difference-in-differences
studies of the effects of a substantial exposure to economics teaching (Frey and Meier
2003; Bauman and Rose 2011). We do not conclude, on the basis of our study of
a single semester in intermediate microeconomics, that economics does not make
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you selfish. It could be that the main effect of studying economics occurs at the
introductory level, or that a single semester is too brief an exposure to produce a
detectable effect. The Bauman and Rose (2011) study, however, suggests caution
in accepting this explanation of our results. They found that the negative effect of
studying economics among non-majors was larger for the intermediate than for the
introductory courses, and estimated that an additional single semester of economics
(at whatever level) reduced contributions by a substantial amount.
The differences between our study and those based on a brief experimentally
induced exposure to economics (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2018; Molinsky, Grant, and
Margolis 2012) arise because we are measuring different things. The experimentally
induced exposure to economics leveraged by these studies provides a frame or a prime,
suggesting the type of problem that is being addressed or activating particular mental
modules. The framing or priming then constitutes a particular state in which the
decision-maker acts. The results of these experiments show that social preferences
are state-dependent (a psychologist would say, situation-dependent).
While the duration of these state-dependent effects has not adequately been stud-
ied, an implication of this interpretation is that the effects of brief experimentally
induced exposure to economics should be temporary. An example of such transient
state-dependent effects is a standard repeated public goods experiment in which moral
or neutral messages are delivered to subjects: the immediate and substantial positive
effect of the moral messages entirely vanished after 10 rounds of play (Dal Bó and
Dal Bó 2014).
The more extended and natural-setting exposure to economics in our study could
have both state-dependent effects and longer term learning effects, by which pref-
erences change in a durable (not state-dependent) manner. A conclusion consistent
with the evidence from previous studies (along with our own) would be that exposure
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to economics has state-dependent effects on preferences, but does not produce the
durable changes in preferences associated with the term endogenous preferences.
We outlined at the outset a line of reasoning that might lead us to affirm the com-
monplace view that studying economics leads to more self-interested behavior. But
there are also cogent reasons to expect the opposite. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Smith
and other 18th century thinkers held that markets promote honesty and cooperative-
ness towards others, and that these predispositions are as important as self-interest
in making markets work.14 Students in today’s economics courses might well marvel
that in markets, even when interacting with total strangers, adherence to social norms
of respect for others’ property rights and reciprocating goodwill (eg, not stealing the
other’s goods) can be the basis for mutually beneficial exchange. Exposure to this
message could promote social preferences as well as self-interest.15
One possible explanation for our results is that the potential mechanisms we out-
lined at the outset, through which studying economics would promote self-interest,
are just not active, or not powerful enough to produce a discernible effect. It is also
possible, however, that these mechanisms are present, but are offset by ”doux com-
merce” mechanisms, as the ones we just described, working in the opposite direction.
14See Bowles (2016). Smith, for example, contrasted the probity of merchants with the untrust-
worthiness of ambassadors and provided a verbal model of the reasons for the difference.
15This was the primary explanation offered of the findings of a cross cultural experimental project
showing that greater exposure to markets was associated with more generous and more fair minded
behavior in an experimental ultimatum game, a result celebrated by the Wall Street Journal as “the
civilizing effect of the market” (Henrich et al. 2001).
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3.6 Figures
Figure 3.1. The location of microeconomics textbooks in a 3 meta-topics space.
Meta-topic 0: Market structure
 and competition
Meta-topic 1: Individual 






Topic 0: market structure and competition
44 Competition and market structure
49 Advertising and consumer demand
51 Measurement; market structure
54 Exit, entry and firm strategy
80 Elasticity of demand and supply




47 Decision theory and expected utility
71 Utility functions; theory
74 Labor supply
93 Intertemporal optimization
Topic 2: Strategic interaction and incomplete 
information
0 Monitoring and enforcement
4 Adverse selection; "lemons"
10 Bargaining and incomplete information
20 Game theory and behavioral economics
52 Incomplete contracts and principal-agent models
69 Theory of games
73 Adverse selection, moral hazard; insurance
94 Strategic interactions, asymmetric information; 
theory
Notes: Coordinates of the textbooks are the topic weights for the meta-topics at the vertices. For
example, Varian has a location of (0.53, 0.28, 0.19), that is, a weight of 0.58 on market structure
(meta-topic 0), a weight of 0.28 on individual optimization and expected utility (meta-topic 1),
and a weight of 0.19 on strategic interaction and incomplete information (meta-topic 2). Source:
Bowles et al. (2019).
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(e) Reciprocity in Trust Game
Notes: Smoothed density plots for the distribution of changes during the semester. Distribution of
changes for economics students in light blue; distribution of changes for the control group (nutrition
students) in red. See Section 3.3.3 and Appendices B.2 and B.3 for the definition of each variable.
108
Figure 3.3. Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ social preferences,






-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations
Selection into Econ Change [Econ]
Change [Non Econ] Effect of Econ





-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations
Selection into Econ Change [Econ]
Change [Non Econ] Effect of Econ






-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations
Selection into Econ Change [Econ]
Change [Non Econ] Effect of Econ
(c) Policy views: simple averages
Notes: The Figures display visually our difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of an
Intermediate Microeconomics course on students’ social preferences, beliefs about other students’
social preferences, and policy preferences. See Section 3.3.3 and Appendices B.2 and B.3 for the
definition of each outcome variable. All outcome variables are standardized. For each outcome of
interest, the graphs display: differences between averages for Intermediate Microeconomics and
non-economics students in the first (pre-treatment) survey round (‘Selection into Econ’); the
average change during the semester among Intermediate Microeconomics students (‘Change
[Econ]’) and non-economics students (‘change [Non econ]’); and our difference-in-differences
estimate of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics (‘Effect of Econ’, given by the difference
between the two changes). Dots represent point estimates, bars are 95% confidence intervals from
standard errors clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 3.4. Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ social preferences,
beliefs and policy preferences – Conventional vs. Post Walrasian curriculum






-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations







-1 -.75 -.5 -.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations
Selection into Post Walrasian econ Effect of Post Walrasian econ
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1. Number of respondents who participated in both rounds of the survey,
by course
Course Frequency Total Enrolled Participation rate
Post Walrasian 37 40 92.5%
Conventional I 60 98 61.2%
Conventional + SP 13 25 52.0%
Conventional II 46 70 65.7%
Nutrition and metabolism 46 62 74.2%
Total 202 295 68.5%
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Table 3.2. Distribution of respondents by gender, region of origin, major and age
Major Age
Female Asia Europe Other US Economics Business 16-18 19-21 22-25 > 26
Course
Post Walrasian 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.91 0.84 0.08 0.07 0.81 0.12 0.00
Conventional I 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.82 0.77 0.16 0.05 0.88 0.07 0.00
Conventional + SP 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.69 0.31 0.00 0.50 0.27 0.23
Conventional II 0.37 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.89 0.85 0.10 0.05 0.90 0.04 0.00
Nutrition 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.53 0.04
Econ vs Non Econ
Non Econ 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.53 0.04
Econ 0.27 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.80 0.13 0.05 0.84 0.09 0.02
Total 0.42 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.87 0.62 0.10 0.04 0.74 0.19 0.02
Notes: For each gender, region of origin, major and age range indicated in column, this Table reports the share of respondents, by course and by
treatment group. Here ‘region of origin’ is defined as the region where a student attended high school.
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Table 3.3. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ social preferences
and beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Generosity in Generosity in Beliefs about Beliefs about Reciprocity in
Dictator Game Trust Game generosity (DG) generosity (TG) Trust Game
[dfsi dg] [dfsi tg p2] [guess dfsi dg] [guess dfsi tg p2] [recip]
Mean Before (Econ) 0.600 0.357 0.469 0.319 0.303
(0.028) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.024)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.650 0.385 0.500 0.307 0.215
(0.051) (0.023) (0.033) (0.022) (0.044)
Selection (into Econ) -0.050 -0.028 -0.031 0.012 0.088
(0.058) (0.026) (0.037) (0.024) (0.05)
Change (Econ) -0.040 -0.031 0.004 -0.028 -0.036
(0.03) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.023)
Change (Non Econ) -0.054 -0.033 0.009 0.004 -0.025
(0.051) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.037)
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.014 0.002 -0.005 -0.032 -0.011
(0.059) (0.022) (0.041) (0.021) (0.044)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.040 0.015 -0.022 -0.220 -0.038
(0.171) (0.14) (0.186) (0.146) (0.146)
N 404 404 404 404 404
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates for the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on students’
social preferences and beliefs about other students’ social preferences. See Section 3.3.3 and Appendix B.2 for the definition of each outcome
variable. All outcome variables range from 0 (perfect self-interest) to 1 (maximum possible deviation from self-interest). The ‘Mean before’ panel
reports the average of the outcome variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round for Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Selection’ is the
difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the
first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our estimates of the effect of intermediate
microeconomics, using the DiD specification in equation 3.1; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same estimated average effect after
standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table 3.4. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ policy views (principal
components)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left-Right Pro market Libertarian Communitarian
Mean Before (Econ) 0.067 0.187 -0.038 -0.066
(0.128) (0.102) (0.087) (0.08)
Mean Before (Non Econ) -0.241 -0.409 -0.131 0.021
(0.221) (0.215) (0.157) (0.152)
Selection (into Econ) 0.308 0.596 0.094 -0.087
(0.256) (0.238) (0.18) (0.172)
Change (Econ) 0.031 -0.146 0.148 0.072
(0.085) (0.103) (0.082) (0.094)
Change (Non Econ) -0.078 0.043 0.017 0.157
(0.175) (0.211) (0.124) (0.173)
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.109 -0.189 0.131 -0.085
(0.195) (0.235) (0.149) (0.197)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.066 -0.142 0.122 -0.083
(0.118) (0.177) (0.139) (0.192)
N 404 404 404 404
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on students’ policy
views. We use Principal Component Analysis to extract the four main components from the 11 policy statements that we ask participants to score.
The ‘Mean before’ panel reports the average of the outcome variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round for Economics and non-Economics
students; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the
outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our estimates of
the effect of intermediate microeconomics, using the DiD specification in equation 3.1; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same
estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table 3.5. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ policy preferences
(simple averages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pro-Market Pro-Gov’t inter-
vention
Pro-Green Trust in gov’t Immigration re-
strictive
Mean Before (Econ) 0.155 0.299 0.538 0.272 -0.359
(0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.037) (0.048)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.003 0.337 0.565 0.293 -0.359
(0.046) (0.05) (0.064) (0.07) (0.095)
Selection (into Econ) 0.152 -0.038 -0.027 -0.021 -0.000
(0.053) (0.058) (0.072) (0.08) (0.107)
Change (Econ) -0.027 0.020 -0.005 -0.106 0.093
(0.023) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (.047)
Change (Non Econ) 0.011 -0.000 -0.027 -0.011 -0.109
(0.05) (0.045) (0.044) (0.072) (0.067)
DiD (Effect of Econ) -0.038 0.020 0.022 -0.095 0.202
(0.055) (0.05) (0.052) (0.078) (0.082)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Econ) -0.121 0.055 0.053 -0.200 0.332
(0.174) (0.137) (0.125) (0.165) (0.135)
N 404 404 404 404 404
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on students’ policy
preferences. Outcome variables are simple averages of scores for policy statements concerning the same topic. See Section 3.3.4 for the precise
definition of each outcome variable. All outcome variables range from -2 to 2. The ‘Mean before’ panel reports the average of the outcome variables
in the first (pre-treatment) survey round for Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between
Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second
(post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics, using the DiD
specification in equation 3.1; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome
variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Additional tables and figures





































Note: Work outside is a dummy that take on 1 if an individual worked outside of the house for
more than 240 hours the past year. Casual is a dummy that equals 1 if the woman took on casual
work for more than 240 hours during the past year. Regular, salaried summarizes a dummy that
takes on 1 if the work performed was regular, salaried. Household wealth is a household asset
index based on housing quality and the consumer durables owned that ranges from 0 (minimum)
to 1 (maximum). Education attainment refers to years of education completed.
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Note: Marital status takes the value of 1 for a married woman and 0 for everyone else. No. of
elders refers to the number of individuals within the household that are 65 years of age or above.
Household size refers to the total number of individuals in the household.
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Figure A.1. Frequency distribution of household wealth, Brahmin vs Adivasi house-
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Note: Household wealth is measured on a 0-1 scale, with 0 being least wealthy and 1 being the
most, based on the ownership of consumer durables and house quality.
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Figure A.2. Frequency distribution of education attainment, Brahmin women vs
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Note: Educational attainment refers to completed years of schooling.
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Figure A.6. Plot of wealth effects by caste - linear probability model with individual
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
124
Table A.3. Household wealth effects on female participation in any work outside
the house - by caste (including details of the covariates)
Brahmin FC OBC Dalit Adivasi
Household wealth 0.0501 -0.149∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗ 0.00153
(0.69) (-3.05) (-5.80) (-2.78) (0.02)
Years of ed -0.00739 -0.0119∗ -0.00318 -0.000735 -0.0324∗∗
(-1.20) (-2.41) (-0.82) (-0.13) (-3.28)
Years of ed (squared) 0.00126∗ 0.000983∗∗ 0.000390 0.000104 0.00344∗∗∗
(2.53) (3.07) (1.36) (0.24) (4.11)
Age 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗
(4.35) (4.04) (9.18) (8.61) (5.51)
Age (squared) -0.000295∗∗∗ -0.000192∗∗∗ -0.000319∗∗∗ -0.000412∗∗∗ -0.000373∗∗∗
(-5.68) (-5.40) (-11.97) (-10.11) (-5.12)
No. of children (0-5) 0.00177 0.00125 -0.00396 -0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0119
(0.24) (0.19) (-0.91) (-4.28) (1.03)
No. of children (6-14) -0.00372 0.0112∗ 0.0102∗∗ 0.00680 0.0280∗∗
(-0.62) (2.21) (3.03) (1.43) (3.06)
Household size -0.000885 -0.00633 -0.00820∗∗∗ 0.00211 -0.0231∗∗∗
(-0.26) (-1.96) (-3.91) (0.65) (-4.20)
No. of elders -0.000110 0.00917 0.00248 -0.0226 -0.0372
(-0.01) (1.00) (0.34) (-1.84) (-1.45)
Marital status -0.0595∗ -0.0486∗∗ -0.0459∗∗ -0.0599∗∗ -0.0225
(-2.04) (-2.60) (-3.12) (-2.89) (-0.58)
Year dummy 0.0349 0.0365∗ 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗ -0.0540∗
(1.82) (2.54) (4.75) (4.79) (-2.19)
Urban dummy -0.00545 0.00601 0.0587∗ 0.0702∗ -0.169
(-0.13) (0.13) (2.14) (2.18) (-1.41)
Constant -0.338∗ 0.00438 -0.0683 -0.264∗∗ -0.181
(-2.53) (0.05) (-1.00) (-2.73) (-1.18)
Observations 3382 9625 23754 14709 5781
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable here is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual participated
in any work outside the house for more than 240 hours in the past year. The results reported are
estimated after controlling for individual fixed effects. Years of ed refers to completed years of own
education. Marital status is a dummy that takes on 1 for a married woman and 0 otherwise. No.
of elders refers to the number of individuals within the household that are 65 years of age or above.
FC refers to Forward Caste and OBC refers to Other Backward Classes.
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Table A.4. Household wealth effects on female participation in casual work - by
caste (including details of the covariates)
Brahmin FC OBC Dalit Adivasi
Household wealth -0.0436 -0.158∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.201∗
(-0.81) (-3.29) (-4.94) (-4.34) (-2.17)
Years of ed -0.0000656 -0.00484 0.00165 0.00937 -0.0211∗
(-0.01) (-1.07) (0.45) (1.72) (-2.54)
Years of ed (squared) 0.000311 0.0000555 -0.000390 -0.00109∗ 0.00123
(0.81) (0.20) (-1.57) (-2.55) (1.93)
Age 0.00100 0.00291 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.84) (8.17) (7.31) (4.68)
Age (squared) -0.0000593 -0.0000579 -0.000280∗∗∗ -0.000345∗∗∗ -0.000347∗∗∗
(-1.60) (-1.73) (-10.37) (-8.59) (-4.95)
No. of children (0-5) -0.00343 -0.000680 -0.00465 -0.0128 0.00642
(-0.56) (-0.10) (-1.06) (-1.96) (0.58)
No. of children (6-14) -0.00117 0.0118∗ 0.00891∗∗ 0.0126∗∗ 0.0171∗
(-0.22) (2.37) (2.63) (2.65) (2.02)
Household size -0.000698 -0.00821∗ -0.00731∗∗∗ -0.00404 -0.0182∗∗∗
(-0.24) (-2.57) (-3.47) (-1.24) (-3.50)
No. of elders -0.0104 0.00379 -0.00161 -0.0175 -0.00169
(-1.21) (0.42) (-0.22) (-1.39) (-0.07)
Marital status -0.0357 -0.0425∗ -0.0493∗∗∗ -0.0295 -0.00339
(-1.39) (-2.29) (-3.40) (-1.44) (-0.09)
Year dummy 0.0311 0.0424∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0902∗∗∗ 0.0288
(1.90) (3.03) (4.87) (5.57) (1.25)
Urban dummy -0.0516 -0.0289 0.0599∗ 0.0667∗ -0.0234
(-1.34) (-0.84) (2.22) (1.98) (-0.98)
Constant 0.149 0.260∗∗ -0.0361 -0.145 0.0229
(1.33) (2.82) (-0.53) (-1.51) (0.16)
Observations 3382 9625 23754 14709 5781
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable here is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual participated
in casual (irregular, temporary) work for more than 240 hours in the past year. The results
reported are after controlling for individual fixed effects. Years of ed refers to completed years of
own education. Marital status is a dummy that takes on 1 for a married woman and 0 otherwise.
No. of elders refers to the number of individuals within the household that are 65 years of age or
above. FC refers to Forward Caste and OBC refers to Other Backward Classes.
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Table A.5. Household wealth effects on female participation in regular, salaried
work - by caste (including details of the covariates)
Brahmin FC OBC Dalit Adivasi
Household wealth 0.110 0.0135 0.00124 0.0644∗∗ 0.0692
(1.90) (0.55) (0.09) (2.99) (1.86)
Years of ed -0.00831 -0.00658∗∗ -0.00368∗ -0.00678∗ -0.00832
(-1.80) (-2.72) (-2.07) (-2.35) (-1.46)
Years of ed (squared) 0.00101∗ 0.000803∗∗∗ 0.000616∗∗∗ 0.000887∗∗ 0.00163∗∗
(2.41) (3.59) (3.43) (3.12) (2.60)
Age 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.00489∗∗∗ 0.00736∗∗∗ 0.00900∗∗∗
(4.65) (5.85) (4.82) (4.83) (3.77)
Age (squared) -0.000231∗∗∗ -0.000133∗∗∗ -0.0000578∗∗∗ -0.0000796∗∗∗ -0.0000812∗∗
(-5.21) (-6.77) (-5.75) (-5.38) (-3.27)
No. of children (0-5) 0.00315 -0.000122 -0.00122 -0.00870∗∗∗ 0.000134
(0.58) (-0.04) (-0.81) (-3.44) (0.03)
No. of children (6-14) -0.00268 0.00134 0.000196 -0.00519∗∗ 0.000403
(-0.56) (0.56) (0.17) (-2.64) (0.12)
Household size 0.000685 0.000654 0.000272 0.00255∗ -0.00231
(0.26) (0.40) (0.38) (2.05) (-1.27)
No. of elders 0.0119 0.00554 -0.00112 -0.00575 0.00997
(1.31) (1.04) (-0.37) (-1.29) (1.42)
Marital status -0.0197 -0.00914 -0.00365 -0.0284∗∗ -0.0351
(-0.75) (-0.88) (-0.54) (-3.07) (-1.94)
Year dummy 0.0130 0.0121 0.0112∗∗ 0.0140∗ -0.0175
(0.80) (1.74) (2.61) (2.30) (-1.84)
Urban dummy 0.0423 0.0174 -0.0000220 0.00409 -0.109
(0.79) (0.49) (-0.00) (0.30) (-0.92)
Constant -0.468∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.0832∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.145∗
(-3.91) (-4.66) (-3.15) (-3.74) (-2.54)
Observations 3382 9625 23748 14703 5779
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable here is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual participated
in regular, salaried work during the past year. The results reported are after controlling for
individual fixed effects. Years of ed refers to completed years of own education. Marital status is a
dummy that takes on 1 for a married woman and 0 otherwise. No. of elders refers to the number
of individuals within the household that are 65 years of age or above. FC refers to Forward Caste
and OBC refers to Other Backward Classes.
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A.2 Differences, by caste, in optimal labor supply
Let us consider a variant of Equation 1.11, a household utility function that does









+ a(1− l)− d(l) (A.1)
where
a > 0 (A.2)




− a− d′ = 0 (A.3)
Since we did not assume a specific functional form for the utility function, we
invoke the implicit function theorem. Given the function:
F (l;w, p, a) = u′
w
p
− a− d′ = 0 (A.4)
we can explicity state l = l(w, p, a) in the neighborhood of (l0, w0, p0, a0) if the con-
tinuous partial derivates, Fl, Fw,Fp and Fa exist. And if Fl 6= 0 in some neighborhood,















Fa = −1 (A.8)
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Given that the conditions of the implicit function theorem are met, we can now
write:
l = l(w, p, a) (A.9)












Equation A.10 states that the higher the a, the lower the optimal labor supply.
In the model a = η for Brahmin women and a = δ(Y ) for non-Brahmin women.
Additionally, from Equations 1.7 and 1.8, we know that δ < η and that δ tends to η
as Y →∞. We therefore know that the labor supply for Brahmin women is less than
that for non-Brahmin women.
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A.3 Sanskritization and work: the men
In this section, I reproduce Figures 1.6 and A.9 but this time for men only.
A few comments are in order before discussing the results. First, in and of itself
this exercise is not meant to shed a light on men’s workforce participation decisions.
The institutional mechanisms faced by men both within the household and outside of
it are very different from those faced by women. Essentially, work outside the house is
not the most useful measure of men’s work for two reasons. First, men do not face the
kind of social stigma that women face when they work outside the house. In fact, it is
almost expected that men hold a job and be bread-winners. Second, ownership and
control over resources are more likely to be with men in family farms and businesses.
And therefore working within the home is not unpaid as it is for women. Second, this
is not a good placebo test for the Sanskritization hypothesis either. Although work
outside the house does not carry as much stigma as it does for women, certain types
of work (regular, salaried) are more respected than others (casual, manual, low-paid)
even for men. Replicating Figures 1.6 and 1.7 for men is done purely for the purpose
of completeness and to ensure that we are not overly ascribing to gender what it does
not explain.
Two findings from Figures A.8 and A.9 are of importance. First, even when we
look only at work outside the house for men, their participation rates are much higher
than women’s (particularly in but not restricted to regular, salaried work). At any
level of wealth, participation in work outside of the house never dips below 40% for
any caste. See Figure A.8(c). And second, systematic differences in wealth effects
across castes do not exist for any type of work. See Figure A.9.
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Figure A.8. Probability of participation in casual work, regular salaried work and
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(c) Work outside the house
Note: In order to construct these figures, a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression was used to
fit lines, without controlling for any other covariates, on a scatter plot of male workforce
participation and household wealth. Each line depicts the proportion of men that work outside the
house, from a given caste, at all levels of household wealth.
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Figure A.9. Wealth effects (coefficients), by caste, for casual work; regular and
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(c) Any work outside
Note: This figure shows the household wealth effects on male participation in work outside the
house broadly and casual and regular salaried work separately. The effects were computed using
Equations 1.24 and 1.25 for men only. I control for individual and time fixed effects. Other
controls include - completed years of education, marital status and age of the man, household size,
number of children between 0 and 5 years of age, number of children between 6 and 14 years of age
and a binary variable for urban areas. The horizontal bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
Non-Brahmin includes the Forward Caste, OBC, Dalit and Adivasi categories.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Experimental design, survey details and questionnaire
B.1.1 Timeline
We administered the same online survey, at the beginning and towards the end of
the semester.
• We administered the first round between January 14 and January 28, 2019.1
• The second round was conducted between April 8 and April 24, 2019.
The complete surveys (in PDF) are included as online appendices.
The steps of the experimental design are explained in the section ”Experimental
Design” of the main paper. Nonetheless, we reiterate them here for clarity. The
survey includes the following:
• standard demographic and academic information,
• questions eliciting students’ policy opinions,
• incentivized choice experiments (economic games), and
• incentivized belief-elicitation questions regarding a subject’s beliefs about the
behavior of others in the same games.
1We allowed students that enrolled in the course after January 28 to take the survey between
January 29 and February 4. 9 students from the Nutrition and Metabolism course participated in
the survey between January 28 and February 4. Results are unchanged if we exclude these ‘late
participants’.
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The wording of all the policy questions is available in Appendix B.1.4, with topics
covering immigration, the functioning of markets, government regulation, and climate
change.
The survey asked participants to play four incentivized games:
• a Triple Dictator Game (DG),
• a Trust Game (TG), and
• two belief-elicitation tasks about the behavior of other participants in these
games.
The order in which the two games were presented was randomized: each partici-
pant was equally likely to play the DG first or the TG first. After completion of the
survey, we randomly selected one of the four games for payment.
B.1.1.1 Triple Dictator Game and belief elicitation
In the Triple Dictator Game (DG) with charities the respondent is allocated $10
and given the possibility to donate a portion to a local non-profit charitable or-
ganization from a list of three. The list included non-partisan, non-controversial,
and apolitical organizations. Any amount donated would be tripled, consistent with
Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2006).
We then ask the subject to guess the average contribution of the other participants.
The subject’s payoff depended on how close they were to the actual average: their
payoff was $12 minus the absolute value of the guessing error. The guessing error is
defined as the difference between a subject’s guess and the average donation of all
other respondents.
B.1.1.2 Trust Game and belief elicitation
In the Trust Game (TG), participants are anonymously and randomly paired
(Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). Within each pair, one player is randomly as-
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signed the role of first mover, while the other is the second mover. The first mover
is allocated $10. She must transfer a share of this $10 of her choice to the second
mover (the amount sent may be zero if the first mover chooses so). The first mover
is also informed that whatever she sends will be tripled by the experimenter. Once
the first mover chooses a value, the experimenter will triple it and transfer it to the
second mover. The second mover is then told to make a similar choice: transfer some
share of the now-tripled money back to the first mover (the amount given back may
be zero, should the second mover choose so).
Subjects played the games asynchronously with matching occurring later. Each
subject specified how they would play both roles (first mover and second mover) and
we used the strategy method for the case of the choices as the second mover. Each
participant was therefore asked to specify:
1. how much they would send as first mover;
2. how much they would send back as second mover for each possible transfer of
the first mover in whole numbers.
B.1.1.3 Matching Rules and Payments
To determine payments, each participant was then (after completion of the sur-
veys) randomly paired with another participant. In each pair, one was randomly
selected as first mover and the other as second mover. We performed the random
matching of participants one week after the opening of the survey (including all who
had responded within the first week), and then at the end of the survey (including
all participants who filled the survey during the second week). In this way, we guar-
anteed that each participant would receive her payoff within one week after survey
completion. Subjects also performed a belief-elicitation task, similar to the one re-
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garding behavior in the DG and with the same payoff rule, with respect to Player 1’s
behavior in the Trust Game.2
Respondents also stated their best guesses about the average responses as Player
2 of all other participants, for each possible amount received from Player 1. Their
payoff was then based on the accuracy of their guesses. A subject’s payoff is $12
minus the subject’s average guessing error. To define the average guessing error, we
take the absolute value of the difference between the subject’s guess and the average
amount transferred as Player 2 by all other players, for each possible amount received
from Player 1, and then take an average across all possible amounts received from
Player 1.
B.1.2 Sample
Our sample comprises students from the following five courses:
• a course with conventional content, offered by the Department of Economics
and using the Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2012) textbook (Conventional I);
• a course with conventional content, offered by the Department of Resource
Economics and using the Perloff (2011) textbook (Conventional II);3
• a course with an innovative ‘behavioral’ curriculum, stressing externalities, in-
complete contracts and social preferences, offered by the Economics Department
and using the Bowles and Halliday (2019) textbook (Post Walrasian);
• an online course with a largely standard curriculum, apart from one section
on the presence of social preferences, offered by the Economics department and
2While we included this belief-elicitation question in the survey for symmetry, we will not use it
in estimation, because the behavior of Player 1 in the TG does not have a clear interpretation in
terms of deviation from self-interest.
3This course is called ‘Price Theory’ but is completely equivalent in content and pre-requisites
to a intermediate microeconomics course.
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using the Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) textbook (Conventional plus Social
Preferences);
• a course on Nutrition and Metabolism offered by the Food Science department,
which we use as a control group.
The economics course which we call for brevity ‘Post Walrasian’ was taught by one of
the authors. It incorporates research from behavioral economics into every aspect of
the course, and does not present ‘homo economicus’ as the norm for behavior. Impor-
tantly, the ‘Post-Walrasian’ approach of the course was not signaled beforehand to
students in any way: the brief course description that students could see in the course
enrollment platform used by the University was identical to that of the conventional
course offered by the same Department (Conventional I) and suggested no difference
between the courses’ content.
As shown in Table 3.1 in the main text, a total of 295 students were enrolled in
these courses. 202 of them completed both rounds of our survey.
B.1.3 Recruitment
To be eligible to participate in the experiment, a subject had to be registered for




• Conventional + SP
• Nutrition
Each subject received a recruitment email at each stage of the experiment (start of
the semester and end of the semester). The text of the email is included in the
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experimental instructions appendix. The email contained a link to the survey and
experimental tasks using Qualtrics. Only subjects who completed the surveys at both
stages were included in the sample.
Students in the sample received an invitation email signed ‘Research Group on
Human Behavior – UMass Amherst’. The invitation email and two subsequent re-
minders were forwarded to students by the course Professor and/or by a Teaching
Assistant (TA).
To encourage participation, students who filled the survey in both rounds received
extra-credits in the course in question, amounting to 1.25% of the final grade in the
Walrasian I course, 2% in the Walrasian II course, 3% in the Post-Walrasian course,
2% in the Walrasian + SP course and 2% in the Nutrition and Metabolism course.
B.1.3.1 Demographic and academic information
We collected information on the age and gender of the respondent, their region of
origin, the year of study (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and their major. We
also asked if they had ever taken an economics course before this semester and if so
how many. We asked them to list all the courses they were taking this semester. We
also asked for the highest level of education completed by both parents as a proxy for
the socio-economic status of the family.
B.1.4 List of policy statements
We asked the respondents to rank the following statements on a five-point Likert
scale (from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’).
1. The US government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone’s
basic needs are satisfied.
2. In most situations, government intervention cannot make the market system
work better.
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3. I tend to trust the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
4. I tend to trust the functioning of the free market.
5. The Government should impose a carbon tax, defined as a tax on the CO2
emissions that a firm produces.
6. The minimum wage in the US should be raised from the current 7.25 dollars
per hour to 14 dollars or more (which would mean around $27000 a year for a
full time worker before deducting taxes).
7. Market competition is mostly good. It weeds out those (people, companies,
etc.) who are not doing a good job, while rewarding good ideas.
8. Market competition can be harmful. It brings out the worst in people and
creates a society of winners and losers.
9. Immigrants from other countries should be prohibited except where it can be
shown that they will contribute to the quality of life of the current resident
population.
10. We owe it to people in the future to pass on to them a planet with environmental
conditions no worse than they are today even if this means tightening our belts
now.
11. Even if pornography is offensive to some, the government should not prohibit
its sale to adults.
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B.2 Measures of self-interest and reciprocity
B.2.0.0.1 Generosity in the DG [dfsi dg] For the Dictator Game, an entirely
self-interested actor would donate nothing and keep everything for herself. The devi-
ation from self interest in the Dictator Game (dfsi dg) would therefore be the total
amount donated minus the total amount that a purely self-interested actor would
donate (zero). We divide this by the total amount that could be donated so that the
deviation from self interest ranges from zero (entirely self interested) to one (entirely
altruistic). This measure captures deviations from self-interest due to generosity.
Generosity in Dictator Game [dfsi dg ] =
Donation in the DG− 0
Max possible donation
(B.1)
B.2.0.0.2 Beliefs about generosity in the DG [guess dfsi dg] We use Equa-
tion B.2 to extract a measure of beliefs about other people’s deviation from self-
interest (due to generosity), using the ‘guessing game’ about donations in the DG.
An individual that expects all others to be self-interested, would expect the average
donation to be zero. We divide the guess by the maximum donation possible, such
that the deviation from self-interest expectation ranges from zero (for a subject who
expects all others to donate nothing) to one (for a subject who expects all others to
donate their entire endowment).
Belief about generosity in DG [guess dfsi dg]
=
Guess about average donation in the DG− 0
Maximum possible donation
(B.2)
B.2.0.0.3 Generosity in the TG [dfsi tg p2 ] As we used the strategy method
for Player 2’s choices in the trust game, we define dfsi tg p2 as the average amount
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returned as Player 2 divided by the maximum average possible (defined as the average
for a hypothetical Player 2 who always returns everything she receives). A self-
interested actor would always return 0. dfsi tg p2 therefore ranges from zero (entirely
self interested) to one (entirely altruistic).
Generosity in Trust Game [dfsi tg p2 ]
=
Average amount returned as Player 2 − 0
Max possible average
(B.3)
B.2.0.0.4 Beliefs about generosity in the TG [guess dfsi tg p2] For the
guessing game about actions of Player 2 in the TG, an individual who expects all
others to be ‘homo economicus’ would expect everyone to keep the entire sum at
their disposal, independently of the amount received, implying an average amount
returned of zero. We divide the guess by the maximum possible average, such that
guess dfsi tg p2 ranges from zero (for a subject who expects all others to always
return zero) to one (for a subject who expects all others to always return the whole
available amount).
Belief about generosity in TG [guess dfsi tg p2 ]
=
Guess about average amount returned as Player 2− 0
Maximum average possible
(B.4)
B.2.0.0.5 Reciprocity in the TG [recip] We also estimate a measure of de-
viation from self-interest due to reciprocity. This is based on Player 2 behavior in
the Trust Game. Specifically, we define reciprocity (recip) as the average effect of
increases in the share of her initial endowment that P1 transfers to P2 on the share
of this transfer passed back by P2 to P1. For instance, if Player 2 does not vary the
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share passed back as the share she receives increases, her reciprocity is 0; if instead
the share passed back increases one-by-one with the share received, reciprocity takes
a value of 1. We estimate this average effect by running the following regression
separately for each individual observation in our sample
P2 transfer to P1
amount available to P2
= α + φ




Reciprocity in TG [recip] = φ (B.5)
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B.3 Aggregate measures of policy preferences
To measure policy preferences on each single policy question, we scored the re-
sponses such that ”Strongly Disagree” would take a value of -2; ”Disagree” would
take a value of -1, ”Neither agree nor disagree” would take a value of 0; ”Agree”
would take a value of 1 and ”Strongly Agree” would take a value of 2.
We then aggregate the information into a smaller number of variables, using two
alternative approaches. First, we perform a standard Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) on the scores given by students to these statements. We extract the first
four components (which together explain 60.8% of variation in the data) and use
them in estimation. Table B.3 reports the loading matrix for all components and the
proportion of variance explained by each.
The second approach consists in taking simple average scores of statements con-
cerning the same topic. Specifically, we consider the following five indexes:
• ‘Pro-market’= (+Q2 +Q4 +Q7−Q8)/8
• ‘Pro-government intervention’ = (+Q1 +Q5 +Q6−Q2)/8
• ‘Pro-green policies’ = (+Q5 +Q10)/4
• ‘Trust in government’ = +Q3/2
• ‘Immigration-restrictive ’ = +Q9/2
where Qi represents the score (defined as above) from the response to question i
(questions are listed in Appendix B.1, Section B.1.4).
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Table B.1. Principal component analysis - Loading matrix
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6 Comp 7 Comp 8 Comp 9 Comp 10 Comp 11
Q1 (Govt. ensure basic needs met) 0.421 0.123 -0.126 0.029 0.256 -0.182 0.108 0.564 -0.592 0.110 -0.020
Q2 (Govt. can’t improve markets) -0.182 0.318 -0.112 0.610 -0.401 0.171 -0.385 0.073 -0.182 0.260 -0.191
Q3 (Trust in the state Govt.) 0.278 0.373 -0.248 -0.081 -0.020 0.497 0.513 -0.319 0.012 0.320 0.002
Q4 (Trust in the market) -0.184 0.562 -0.107 0.009 -0.117 0.051 0.157 0.297 0.127 -0.625 0.320
Q5 (Pro carbon tax) 0.426 0.149 -0.089 -0.099 0.263 0.272 -0.454 -0.021 0.228 -0.343 -0.509
Q6 (Pro $15 min wage) 0.402 -0.001 -0.294 0.250 -0.046 -0.349 -0.054 0.162 0.628 0.250 0.282
Q7 (Market competition good) -0.094 0.526 0.168 -0.033 0.140 -0.642 0.123 -0.307 0.023 0.095 -0.367
Q8 (Market competition harmful) 0.218 -0.250 0.192 0.686 0.082 -0.017 0.415 -0.181 -0.027 -0.387 -0.139
Q9 (Severely restrict immigration) -0.302 0.145 0.156 0.266 0.784 0.216 -0.108 0.049 0.125 0.210 0.238
Q10 (Sustain the environment) 0.406 0.177 0.344 0.009 -0.064 -0.037 -0.358 -0.423 -0.265 -0.075 0.546
Q11 (Don’t prohibit pornography) 0.155 0.120 0.772 -0.069 -0.208 0.177 0.127 0.390 0.258 0.194 -0.114
Proportion
24.688% 16.122% 10.421% 9.590% 7.575% 6.789% 5.843% 5.280% 5.086% 4.661% 3.945%
Explained
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B.4 Detailed results of the survey eliciting policy views
Figure B.1. Scoring of policy statements: beginning of the semester
Q10 − Environmental legacy Q11 − Don't prohibit pornography
Q7 − Competition mostly good Q8 − Competition mostly harmful Q9 − Prohibit immigration
Q4 − Trust free market Q5 − Govt should tax CO2 Q6 − Raise min wage
Q1 − Govt. satisfy needs Q2 − Govt. impedes markets Q3 − Trust govt.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5


























Figure B.2. Scoring of policy statements: end of the semester
Q10 − Environmental legacy Q11 − Don't prohibit pornography
Q7 − Competition mostly good Q8 − Competition mostly harmful Q9 − Prohibit immigration
Q4 − Trust free market Q5 − Govt should tax CO2 Q6 − Raise min wage
Q1 − Govt. satisfy needs Q2 − Govt. impedes markets Q3 − Trust govt.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5






















Figure B.3. Scoring of policy statements: change during the semester
Q10 − Environmental legacy Q11 − Don't prohibit pornography
Q7 − Competition mostly good Q8 − Competition mostly harmful Q9 − Prohibit immigration
Q4 − Trust free market Q5 − Govt should tax CO2 Q6 − Raise min wage
Q1 − Govt. satisfy needs Q2 − Govt. impedes markets Q3 − Trust govt.
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B.5 Behavior in games by gender
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B.6 Estimates including only female students
.
Figure B.9. Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on the social preferences, beliefs
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B.7 Details on the effect of different course content
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Figure B.11. Effect of Walrasian Intermediate Microeconomics on policy preferences
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Figure B.12. Effect of Post Walrasian Intermediate Microeconomics on policy pref-
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Table B.2. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on social preferences –
Walrasian vs. Post Walrasian curriculum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Generosity in Generosity in Beliefs about Beliefs about Reciprocity in
Dictator Game Trust Game generosity (DG) generosity (TG) Trust Game
dfsi dg dfsi tg p2 guess dfsi dg guess dfsi tg p2 recip
Mean Before (Walras) 0.557 0.352 0.454 0.326 0.290
( 0.034) ( 0.015) ( 0.022) ( 0.014) ( 0.029)
Mean Before (Post Walras) 0.716 0.350 0.519 0.287 0.345
( 0.052) ( 0.014) ( 0.034) ( 0.020) ( 0.048)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.650 0.385 0.500 0.307 0.215
( 0.049) ( 0.023) ( 0.033) ( 0.022) ( 0.038)
Selection (Walras) -0.093 -0.033 -0.046 0.019 0.074
( 0.059) ( 0.028) ( 0.039) ( 0.027) ( 0.048)
Selection (Post Walras) 0.066 -0.035 0.019 -0.020 0.130
( 0.072) ( 0.027) ( 0.048) ( 0.030) ( 0.062)
Change (Walras) -0.045 -0.029 0.010 -0.035 -0.019
( 0.037) ( 0.019) ( 0.027) ( 0.017) ( 0.028)
Change (Post Walras) -0.057 -0.036 -0.022 0.006 -0.059
( 0.062) ( 0.028) ( 0.035) ( 0.025) ( 0.052)
Change (Non Econ) -0.054 -0.033 0.009 0.004 -0.025
( 0.051) ( 0.016) ( 0.036) ( 0.016) ( 0.037)
DiD (Effect of Walras) 0.009 0.004 0.002 -0.039 0.005
( 0.063) ( 0.025) ( 0.045) ( 0.024) ( 0.046)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.002 -0.003 -0.030 0.002 -0.035
( 0.080) ( 0.033) ( 0.050) ( 0.030) ( 0.063)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Walras) 0.026 0.026 0.008 -0.266 0.018
( 0.182) ( 0.157) ( 0.204) ( 0.163) ( 0.155)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.007 -0.021 -0.138 0.017 -0.116
( 0.231) ( 0.207) ( 0.227) ( 0.203) ( 0.212)
N 378 378 378 378 378
Notes: See Section 3.3.3 and Appendix B.2 for the definition of each outcome variable. All outcomes range from 0 (perfect self-interest) to 1 (max.
possible deviation from self-interest). ‘Mean before’ is the average of the outcome variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round; ‘Selection’ is
the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the
first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our DiD estimates of the effect of intermediate
microeconomics; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table B.3. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on policy views – Walrasian
vs. Post Walrasian curriculum (simple averages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pro-Market Pro-Gov’t
intervention
Pro-Green Trust in gov’t Immigration
restrictive
Mean Before (Walras) 0.195 0.261 0.498 0.288 -0.321
( 0.028) ( 0.033) ( 0.039) ( 0.042) ( 0.060)
Mean Before (Post Walras) 0.041 0.443 0.682 0.270 -0.486
( 0.066) ( 0.062) ( 0.052) ( 0.098) ( 0.097)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.003 0.337 0.565 0.293 -0.359
( 0.046) ( 0.050) ( 0.065) ( 0.070) ( 0.095)
Selection (Walras) 0.192 -0.076 -0.068 -0.006 0.038
( 0.054) ( 0.060) ( 0.076) ( 0.082) ( 0.113)
Selection (Post Walras) 0.038 0.106 0.117 -0.023 -0.128
( 0.080) ( 0.080) ( 0.083) ( 0.120) ( 0.136)
Change (Walras) -0.031 0.032 0.021 -0.123 0.066
( 0.029) ( 0.027) ( 0.038) ( 0.042) ( 0.059)
Change (Post Walras) -0.014 -0.000 -0.061 -0.095 0.135
( 0.037) ( 0.038) ( 0.042) ( 0.054) ( 0.094)
Change (Non Econ) 0.011 -0.000 -0.027 -0.011 -0.109
( 0.050) ( 0.045) ( 0.044) ( 0.072) ( 0.067)
DiD (Effect of Walras) -0.042 0.032 0.048 -0.112 0.175
( 0.058) ( 0.052) ( 0.058) ( 0.083) ( 0.089)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.024 0.000 -0.034 -0.084 0.244
( 0.062) ( 0.059) ( 0.061) ( 0.090) ( 0.115)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Walras) -0.132 0.087 0.116 -0.236 0.288
( 0.184) ( 0.143) ( 0.138) ( 0.175) ( 0.147)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.077 -0.000 -0.080 -0.177 0.401
( 0.197) ( 0.162) ( 0.146) ( 0.189) ( 0.190)
N 378 378 378 378 378
Notes: See Section 3.3.4 for the definition of each outcome variable. All outcomes range from -2 to 2. ‘Mean before’ is the average of the outcome
variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students;
‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD
(Effect of Econ)’ reports our DiD estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same
estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
155
Table B.4. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on policy views – Walrasian
vs. Post Walrasian curriculum (principal components)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left-Right Pro market Libertarian Communitarian
Mean Before (Walras) 0.260 0.313 -0.102 -0.010
( 0.147) ( 0.119) ( 0.111) ( 0.095)
Mean Before (Post Walras) -0.644 -0.097 0.064 -0.077
( 0.281) ( 0.231) ( 0.159) ( 0.180)
Mean Before (Non Econ) -0.241 -0.409 -0.131 0.021
( 0.222) ( 0.216) ( 0.158) ( 0.153)
Selection (Walras) 0.501 0.721 0.029 -0.031
( 0.266) ( 0.246) ( 0.193) ( 0.180)
Selection (Post Walras) -0.403 0.311 0.195 -0.098
( 0.358) ( 0.316) ( 0.224) ( 0.236)
Change (Walras) -0.033 -0.165 0.163 0.051
( 0.113) ( 0.135) ( 0.107) ( 0.118)
Change (Post Walras) 0.165 -0.092 0.229 -0.038
( 0.121) ( 0.177) ( 0.123) ( 0.163)
Change (Non Econ) -0.078 0.043 0.017 0.157
( 0.176) ( 0.212) ( 0.124) ( 0.173)
DiD (Effect of Walras) 0.045 -0.208 0.146 -0.106
( 0.209) ( 0.251) ( 0.164) ( 0.210)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) 0.243 -0.136 0.211 -0.195
( 0.214) ( 0.276) ( 0.175) ( 0.238)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Walras) 0.028 -0.156 0.136 -0.103
( 0.127) ( 0.188) ( 0.153) ( 0.204)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) 0.147 -0.102 0.198 -0.190
( 0.130) ( 0.207) ( 0.163) ( 0.232)
N 378 378 378 378
Notes: See Section 3.3.4 for the definition of each outcome variable. All outcomes range from -2 to 2. ‘Mean before’ is the average of the outcome
variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students;
‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD
(Effect of Econ)’ reports our DiD estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same
estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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